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The First Women Members of the
Supreme Court Bar, 1879-1900

MARY L. CLARK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1879, Belva A. Lockwood of Washington, D.C., became the first
woman member of the bar of the U. S. Supreme Court. Lockwood had
applied for admission to the bar three years earlier, but had been refused
on the ground that no woman had ever been admitted and thus there was
no precedent for women's admission. Not easily defeated, Lockwood
lobbied Congress to amend the rules governing admission of attorneys to
the Supreme Court bar to allow for women as well as men. In February,
1879, Congress adopted "an Act to relieve certain legal disabilities of
women," which authorized women to be admitted to practice before the
Court.
Lockwood promptly reapplied for admission, which was
granted, making her the first woman member of the Supreme Court bar.
Over the course of the next twenty years, from 1880 to 1900, nineteen

other women joined Lockwood as members of the Supreme Court bar.
Prior to joining the high court's bar, these women had achieved many
other "firsts" for women in the legal profession, by being the first
women to attend, or graduate from, their law schools, the first women to
* Judicial Fellow, U.S. Supreme Court's Judicial Fellows Program. Formerly a
Fellow and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University Law Center. J.D., Harvard Law
School; A.B., Bryn Mawr College. The author wishes to thank the participants in
Georgetown's Summer 1998 Faculty Research Workshop for their thoughtful critiques
of earlier drafts of this Article.
1. An Act to Relieve Certain Legal Disabilities of Women, ch.81, 20 Stat. 292
(1879).

join their states' bars, or the first women to hold particular positions
within the legal profession, such as law school dean and master of
chancery. In breaking barriers to women's entry into the legal
profession, and achieving a high degree of professional success while
doing so, these women were recognized as leading women lawyers of
their day.
These early female Supreme Court bar members were well known to
one another. They worked together in the woman suffrage movement,
were active in the same professional and voluntary associations, and
corresponded with one another about personal and professional issues.
In time, they began to move each other's admission in the Supreme
Court bar. For example, in 1890, Ada M. Bittenbender, the third woman
member of the Supreme Court bar, moved the admission of Emma M.
Gillett, the seventh woman member of the Supreme Court bar. Then in
1891, Gillett moved the admission of Marila Ricker, the ninth woman
member of the Supreme Court bar. Ellen Spencer Mussey of
Washington, D.C., the thirteenth woman member, moved the admission
of over twenty women in the Supreme Court bar between 1897 and
1920.
Following highlights of the Supreme Court activities of the first
women bar members, this Article focuses specifically upon the
backgrounds, activities, and thoughts of thirteen of the first twenty
women members, about whom most is found in the primary and
secondary sources, in an effort to learn what motivated them to join the
Supreme Court bar. These women are: Ada Bittenbender, Myra
Bradwell, Clara Shortridge Foltz, J. Ellen Foster, Emma Gillett, Laura
DeForce Gordon, Carrie Burnham Kilgore, Belva Lockwood, Catharine
Waugh McCulloch, Alice Minick, Ellen Spencer Mussey, Marilla
Ricker, and Lelia Robinson-Sawtelle. In exploring why these women

wanted to join the bar, this Article examines four points of commonality
shared by them: (1) their similarities in educational, professional,
personal, and law practice experiences; (2) their active involvement in,
and leadership of, the woman suffrage movement; (3) their membership
in the Equity Club, a correspondence society of women lawyers, formed
in the late 1880s, through which they brainstormed about issues
confronting them as women lawyers; and (4) their consciousness of
being first women lawyers, both as role models for other women and
examples for society generally.

2. See "Women Admitted to Practice in the Supreme Court of the United States,"
availablein the Supreme Court file, Supreme Court Library (listing 97 women admitted
to practice before the Supreme Court by 1920 and noting that Mussey sponsored 25 of

them).
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This Article concludes with some thoughts about what motivated these
women to join the Supreme Court bar in the last two decades of the
nineteenth century. In light of the fact that most of them did not brief or
argue cases in the Supreme Court, and a number were not engaged in
litigation generally, why did they want to join the bar? Were they
genuinely interested in and expecting to litigate in the Supreme Court,
but were prevented from doing so by pervasive sex discrimination,
which denied them opportunities for clients and cases in the high court?

Were they motivated to join the Supreme Court bar by the professional
prestige membership conferred? Were they motivated by the ability to
sponsor others' membership in the bar as a means to bolster their
standing in the legal community, or as a way of fostering an "old girls"

network of Supreme Court bar members? Or were they motivated to
join the Supreme Court bar as a further step toward breaking down
barriers to women's entry into the legal profession?
II. LOCKWOOD'S PIONEERING EFFORTS TO JOIN THE
SUPREME COURT BAR
Belva Lockwood had been a member of the bar of the Supreme Court

of the District of Columbia for three years when she first applied for
membership in the bar of the United States Supreme Court in 1876.3 Her
application was denied on November 6, 1876, in an order authored by
Chief Justice Morrison Waite, which declared:
By the uniform practice of the court, from its organization to the present time,
and by the fair construction of its rules, none but men are admitted to practise
[sic] before it as attorneys and counsellors. This is in accordance with
immemorial usage in England, and the law and practice in all the States until
within a recent period; and the Court does not feel called upon to make a
change, until such a change is recjuired by statute, or a more extended practice
in the highest courts of the States.

3. As in the present day, an applicant for membership in the Supreme Court bar
in the late nineteenth century was required to demonstrate a minimum of three years'
membership in good standing in the bar of her state's highest court, and to have her
application sponsored by a current member of the Supreme Court bar. If her application
was approved, admission would then be moved and granted in open court. It was not
until the 1970s that applications for admission to the Supreme Court bar were processed
by mail. See KEVIN T. McGuIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITEs IN THE
WASHINGTON COMMUNriY 135 (1993) (noting that "[i]n 1970....
under the leadership
of Chief Justice Burger, the Court changed its rules to allow application and admission
by mail, an increasingly popular option.").
4. Supreme Court Order of November 6, 1876, in Summary of Events, 11 AM. L.

Thus, the Court refused to admit Lockwood on the ground that there was
no precedent for women's admission to that Court's bar. In effect, the
Court deferred the issue of women's admission by looking to Congress
and the state supreme courts to lead the way.
In response, Lock-wood lobbied Congress over the course of the next
three years to amend the statute governing membership in the Supreme
Court bar to include women as well as men. Lockwood's formal

petition to Congress stated as follows:
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress
assembled:
Your Petitioner would respectfully represent that she is a citizen of the
District of Columbia and has been a resident therein for the past two years.
That your petitioner graduated with honor from Genesee College, N.Y. in
1857, received her second degree from Syracuse University in 1870, and
was admitted to the National Law University of Washington, D.C. the

same year. That she duly passed through the curriculum of study of the last
named University and received her diploma therefor May 1873 with the
degree of Bachelor of Laws.
That your petitioner was duly admitted in accordance with its rules to the
bar of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia Sept. 24th 1873; that
since that time now more than three years she has had a large practice
before the said Court, as well as a large and varied practice before the
several Departments of the General Government.
That it has been the custom hitherto to admit on motion and taking the oath
of office, to the Supreme Court of the United States, such members of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia as have been for three years in
practice before said Court.
That your petitioner has been debarred from admission to the United States
Supreme Court on the ground that she is a woman, and that fact has been
largely published over the country much to the detriment of her law
practice upon which your petitioner and her family are dependant [sic] for
support.
Wherefore your petitioner prays your Honorable Body for the passage of an
Act enabling her or any other woman similarly situated to be admitted to
the said United States Supreme Court on the same terms as men are
admitted, and thus your petitioner will ever pray.5

Her petition was signed "Belva A. Lockwood."6
REv., 1876-1877, at 367 (Moorfield Storey and Samuel Hoar eds., 1877).
5. Lockwood's original petition to Congress is on file with the Congressional
Records Division of the National Archives (emphasis in original).
6. Id.
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Several aspects of Lockwood's petition are of particular interest.
First, she insisted in her petition that women be admitted to the Supreme
Court bar on the same terms as men. She also made reference to the
broad publicity given the denial of her application for admission to the
Supreme Court bar. In addition, she claimed that the Supreme Court's
refusal to admit her, and the publicity generated thereby, had a
detrimental effect upon her practice, thereby suggesting that she lost
cases or clients otherwise available to her as a result of the refusal.
Finally, Lockwood asserted that her family was dependent upon her law
practice for support. On this last point, Lockwood was married to her
second husband, Ezekiel Lockwood, at the time that she originally
applied for, and was denied, admission to the Supreme Court bar.
Ezekiel died in 1877, shortly after Lockwood's petition to Congress.7
As for the publicity that Lockwood's struggle engendered, Myra
Bradwell's Chicago Legal News, among others, covered the story

extensively.8 Indeed, Emma Gillett attributed her decision to become a
lawyer in part to Lockwood's struggle to join the Supreme Court bar,
which Gillett learned of through its broad publicity.9
Lockwood's lobbying efforts succeeded in securing women's
admission to the Supreme Court bar on February 15, 1879, when
Congress enacted "an Act to relieve certain legal disabilities of women,"
which largely tracked the language of the bill that Lockwood had
drafted,"0 when it provided:
Be it enacted... That any woman who shall have been a member of the bar of

7. See Belva Lockwood, My Efforts to Become a Lawyer, LIPPINCOTrS MONTHLY
Feb. 1888, at 227, reprinted in 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: FROM COLONIAL

MAG.,

TIMES TO TIE NEW DEAL 259, 264 (Marlene Stein Wortman ed., Holmes & Meier

Publishers 1985) [hereinafter WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW].

8. See, e.g., Women's Right to Practice in the U.S. Courts, CI.LEGAL NEWS 169
(Feb. 10, 1877) (reporting introduction in House of Representatives of 'Bill to Relieve
the Legal Disabilities of Women"); Women as Lawyers, Cm. LEGAL NEws 271-72 (May

11, 1878) (reporting House debate on bill); see also Summary of Events, 12 AM. L. REV.,
1877-1878, at 391 (Samuel Hoar & Moorfield Storey eds., 1878) (reporting introduction
in House of bill "providing that women should be admitted on the same terms as men to
practise [sic] in all the Federal courts.").
9. Gillett moved to Washington, D.C., to study law shortly after Lockwood's
admission to the Supreme Court bar, and lived temporarily in Lockwood's home while
apprenticing in Lockwood's law office. See Mary L. Clark, The Founding of the
Washington College of Law: The First Law School Establishedby Women for Women,

47 AM. U. L. Rnv. 613, 625-26 (1998).
10. See 1 WOMEN INAMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 264 (setting forth language
of draft bill that she succeeded in having introduced in House in December, 1877).

the highest court of any State or Territory or of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia for the space of three years, and shall have maintained a
good standing before such court, and who shall be a person of good moral
character, shall, on motion, and the production of such record, be admitted to
practice before the Supreme Court of the United States."

Reapplying for admission, Lockwood became the first woman to join
the Court's bar on March 3, 1879. Lockwood's 1879 application was
moved by Albert G. Riddle, a white professor at Howard Law School

who was the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia.'2 Riddle
had presented Lockwood to the Court at the time that her first
application for membership was denied.13 He subsequently moved the
admission of at least two other women to the Supreme Court bar, Laura
DeForce Gordon and Carrie Burnham Kilgore.14 Marila Ricker, another
early member of the Supreme Court bar, read law with Riddle in
preparation for the bar examination and was admitted to the District of

Columbia bar in 1882, "having passed the bar examination with the

highest grade of all who were admitted at the time."'5 A year after
joining the Supreme Court bar, Lockwood moved the admission of

Samuel R. Lowery of Huntsville, Alabama, 6 the first southern black to
be admitted to that Court's bar.'7
III. THE FIRST TWENTY WOMEN MEMBERS OF
THE SUPREME COURT BAR

Following Lockwood, the next nineteen women members of the
Supreme Court bar, in order of their admission, were (2) Laura DeForce

Gordon of San Francisco, California, (3) Ada Bittenbender of Lincoln,
Nebraska, (4) Carrie Burnham Kilgore of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
(5) Clara Shortridge Foltz of San Diego, California, (6) Lelia Robinson11.
(1879).

An Act to Relieve Certain Legal Disabilities of Women, ch.81, 20 Stat. 292

12. See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER,
1844-1944, at 85 n.224 (1993).
13. See I WOMEN INAMERICAN LAw, supra note 7, at 263. See Supreme Court bar
admission records (on file with the National Archives).
14. See Supreme Court Attorney Rolls, Vol. 4 (1884 Term-1897 Term) (on file
with the National Archives).
15. Dorothy Thomas, Marilla Marks Young Ricker, in 3 NOTABLE AMERICAN
WOMEN, 1607-1950: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 154 (1971) [hereinafter NOTABLE
AMERICAN WOMEN].

16. See Supreme Court Attorney Rolls, Vol. 3 (1870 Term-1883 Term) (on file
with the National Archives).
17. See Louis Filler, Belva Ann Bennett McNall Lockwood, in 2 NOTABLE
AMERICAN WOMEN, supra note 15, at 414. The first black to join the Supreme Court bar
was Dr. John S. Rock, on February 1, 1865. See Clarence G. Contee, The Supreme
Court Bar's First Black Member, in YEARBOOK 1976: SuPREME COuRT HISTORICAL
SoCIErY 82, 82 (1976).
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Sawtelle of Boston, Massachusetts, (7) Emma Gillett of Washington,
D.C., (8) Kate Kane of Chicago, Illinois, (9) Marilla Ricker of
Washington, D.C., (10) Myra Bradwell of Chicago, Illinois, (11) Fannie
O'Linn of Chadron, Nebraska, (12) Kate H. Pier of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, (13) Ellen Spencer Mussey of Washington, D.C., (14) Alice
Minick of Lincoln, Nebraska, (15) Caroline H. Pier of Milwaukee,

Wisconsin, (16) J. Ellen Foster of Washington, D.C., (17) Catharine
Waugh McCulloch of Chicago, Illinois, (18) Clara Power of Boston,
Wisconsin, and (20)
Massachusetts, (19) Kate Pier of Milwaukee,
18
Harriet H. Pier of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Table 1 sets forth the date of admission to the Supreme Court bar for
each of the first twenty women members, the state and year of their
admission to the bar of their state's highest court, the state and year of
their birth, their place of residence at the time of admission to the
Supreme Court bar, and the name and affiliation of their movant.
The table allows for several initial observations about these first
twenty women. To begin with, they were in the vast minority as
members of the Supreme Court bar, where 250 to 350 attorneys joined
each term and, of those, just a few were women. For example, in the
1883 Term, there were 279 new admittees and no women. 9 In the 1889
Term, there were 322 new admittees, with five women." Second, they
represent two age groupings, or generations, of women-one born
between 1830 and 1838 and another born between 1848 and 1862-and
ranged in age from 36 to 61 at the time of their Supreme Court bar
Third, they were geographically concentrated in
admission.
Washington, D.C., and Chicago. Eight of the women practiced in these
two cities, while three practiced in Nebraska, two in California, two in
Boston, and the four members of the Pier family-mother, Kate Pier,
and her three daughters, Kate H. Pier, Caroline H. Pier, and Harriet H.
Pier-practiced in Wisconsin with their husband/father, Colonel C.K.
Pier.2 ' Fourth, their Supreme Court bar admissions were not infrequently
18. See Table 1, "First Twenty Women Members of the Supreme Court Bar," infra
at 95; see also Supreme Court Attorney Rolls, Vols. 3-5 (1870 Term-1916 Term) (on
file with the National Archives).
19.

See Supreme Court Attorney Rolls, Vol. 3 (1870 Term-1883 Term) (on file

with the National Archives).
20. See Supreme Court Attorney Rolls, Vol. 4 (1884 Term-1897 Term) (on file
with the National Archives).
21. See Ada M. Bittenbender, Woman in Law, in WOMAN'S WORK IN AMERICA
218, 240 (Annie Nathan Meyer ed., 1891) [hereinafter Bittenbender, WOMAN'S WORK IN

moved by members of Congress.'
The following table also reveals that these first twenty women began
to move each others' applications for admission to the Supreme Court
bar. This occurred for the first time in 1890 when Ada Bittenbender, the
third woman member of the Supreme Court bar, moved the admission of
Emma Gillett, the seventh woman member of the Supreme Court bar.
This was quickly followed in 1891 when Gillett moved the admission
of Marilla Ricker, the ninth woman member of the Supreme Court bar.
Thereafter, Belva Lockwood moved the admission of Alice Minick in
1897, and Kate H. Pier moved the admission of her sister, Caroline H.
Pier, in 1897, as well as her mother, Kate Pier, and other sister, Harriet
H. Pier, in 1900. Finally, Ellen Spencer Mussey moved the admission of

J. Ellen Foster in 1897, as well as that of over twenty other women
between 1900 and 1920.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AcTIvrms OF THE FIRST TWENTY WOMEN
BAR MEMBERS
Four of the first twenty women members of the Supreme Court bar
actually litigated in the high court. These were Bittenbender, Foltz,
Lockwood, and Mussey. How they got their high court clients,
especially in solo representation cases, is not known, with the exception
of Bittenbender, who represented her own temperance interests in the
Supreme Court. Of these four women, Bittenbender and Foltz filed
briefs in one action each, while Lockwood and Mussey presented oral
argument in at least one case in addition to filing briefs in multiple
cases.
Bittenbender filed a brief, co-signed by her attorney-husband, on
behalf of her and her husband in Nebraska ex rel. Bittenbenderv. Excise
BoardB during the Supreme Court's 1916 Term. The case involved the
question of whether an 1858 act of the Nebraska territorial legislature
had repealed an 1855 act of the same legislature prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor. In filing the action, the
Bittenbenders sought a declaration that the 1858 act did not repeal the
earlier act?2 They also sought a writ of mandamus directing the Excise
AMERICA].

22. This practice of members of Congress moving applications for admission to
the Supreme Court bar was not uncommon, as reflected in the Supreme Court bar

admission records, which are on file with the National Archives.
23. 244 U.S. 645 (1917).
24. See Relators Motion for a Writ of Mandamus at 3, Nebraska ex rel.
Bittenbender v. Excise Board, 244 U.S. 645 (No. 18719). The motion was filed by

Bittenbender in the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska. The district court case
was not published but the motion is contained in the Supreme Court records for the case,
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TABLE 1. FIRST 20 WOMEN MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT BAR
NAME

BELVAA.

DATE OF
ADMISSION
TO
SUPREME
COURT BAR

STATE AND
YEAR OF
ORIGINAL
BAR
ADMISSION

STATE AND
YEAR OF
BIRTH

RESIDENCE
ATTIMEOF
ADMISSION
TO SUPREME
COURT BAR

NAMEAND
AFFILIATION
OF MOVANT

3/311879

Washington,

New York

Washington,

AlbertRiddle

D.C. 1873

1830

D.C.

Howard Law

California
1879
Nebraska 1883

Pennsylvania
1838
Pennsylvania

San Francisco
CA
Lincoln

Albert Riddle
Howard Law
Henry Blair

1848

NE

U.S. Senate

Pennsylvania
1886
California
1878

Vermont
1838
Indiana
1849

Philadelphia
PA
San Diego
CA

Albert Riddle
Howard Law
TJ.Clurie
U.S. House

Massachusetts

Massachusetts

Boston

George Hoar

1882

1850

MA

U.S. Senate

Washington,

Wisconsin

Washington,

Ada

D.C. 1883

1852

D.C.

Bittenbender

New
Hampshire
1840

Chicago
IL

Robert
Ingersoll

Washington,

Emma

LOCKWOOD

LAURAD.
GORDON
ADAM.
BrITENBENDER
CARRIE B.
KILGORE
CLARA
SHORTRIDGE

2/2/1885
10/15/1888
1/8/1890
3/4/1890

FOL'fZ

4/8/1890

LETAROBINSONSAWIELLE

4/811890

EMMAM.
G ILLETT

KATE KANE

5/19/1890

Wisconsin
1878

MARILLAM.
RICKER
MYRABRADWELL

5/11/1891

Washington,

-

D.C.

D.C. 1882

3/28/1892

1/31/1894

KATE H. PIER

Vermont

Chicago

W.H.H. Miller

1890

1831

IL

Attorney
General

Chadron

WJ. Bryan

NE

U.S. House

Nebraska

10/17/1893

FANNIE O'LINN

Gillett

Illinois

Wisconsin
Ohio
1850

Milwaukee
WI
Washington,
D.C.
Lincoln

W.F. Vilas
U.S. Senate

Watson
Newton
Belva

ELLEN SPENCER
MUSSEY
ALICE A. MINICK

5/25/1896
1/18/1897

Washington,
D.C. 1893
Nebraska

CAROLINE H. PIER

1/18/1897

Wisconsin

L ELLEN FOSTER

12/20/1897

CATHARINEW.
MCCULLOCH

2/21/1898

Iowa
1872
Illinois
1886

CLARAL. POWER

4/3/1899

Massachusetts

-

Boston
MA

Attorney
General

KATE PIER

2/1/1900

Wisconsin

-

Milwaukee

Kate H. Pier

HARRIEr H. PIER

2/1/1900

Massachusetts
1840
New York
1862

NE

Lockwood

Milwaukee
WI
Washington,
D.C.
Chicago
IL

Kate H. Pier
Ellen Mussey
Charles Beale

Griggs
WI

I
I

Wisconsin

Milwaukee

_____wiscoar

WI

which are on file in the National Archives.

Kate H. Pier

Board of Lincoln, Nebraska, to perform its duties in regulating the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor.' The Nebraska district
court had ruled against them, with the Nebraska Supreme Court
affirming. On May 21, 1917, the Supreme Court dismissed their appeal
for want of jurisdiction.6
Foltz co-signed a brief with Mr. A. C. Searle, which was filed on
behalf of Alfred Clarke, the plaintiff-in-error in Clarke v. McDade,27
during the Court's 1896 Term. The appeal involved a California
Superior Court's adjudication of Clarke's insolvency.' It is unclear at
what stage of the litigation Foltz became involved. On January 25,
1897, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction to consider the matter where there was neither a final
judgment nor a federal question presented.Y
Lockwood was considerably more active in the Supreme Court bar
than either Bittenbender or Foltz, filing briefs in several cases and
presenting oral argument in at least one case, making her the first
woman ever to do so.' Lockwood co-signed a brief with Michael L.
Woods on behalf of the appellants Henry and Caroline Kaiser in Kaiser
v. Stickney 3' during the Court's 1880 Term. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia that a deed for property owned by Mrs. Kaiser, in her
individual capacity as a wife, was a valid conveyance in trust to secure a
debt so long as the deed was also executed by the husband.32 In an

action initiated in the trial court by Lockwood,33 the Kaisers had sought
to set aside the deed on the ground that "it was executed by the wife
alone for the conveyance of her general property, and, therefore, not
binding."' The Court rejected this argument, instead holding for the
bank in ruling the deed valid "because it was executed by both the
25. See id.
26. See Bittenbender,244 U.S. at 645.
27.

165 U.S. 168 (1897).

28. See id. at 169.
29. See id. at 168, 174.

30. New research suggests that Lockwood may have presented argument in the
Supreme Court on two occasions, the first being in Kaiser v. Stickney in 1880, one year
after Lockwood joined the Supreme Court Bar. See Clare Cushman, Belva Lockwood's
FirstAppearance at the Supreme Court,20 Sup. CT. HisT. Soc. Q., No. 1, at 3 (1999).
31. 131 U.S. app. clxxxvii (1880).

32. See id. at clxxxviii.

33. See Plaintiffs' Bill of Complaint at 1-5, Kaiser v. Stickney (equity doc. 15, No.
4552). The action was filed by Lockwood in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia on August 6, 1875. The bill of complaint is contained in the Supreme Court
records for this case (131 U.S. app. clxxxvii), which are on file in the National Archives.
34. Kaiser, 131 U.S. app. at clxxxviii.
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husband and wife." 35
Next, Lockwood was the sole legal representative of the claimantpetitioner in Friend v. United States, 36 filed during the Court's 1895
Term. This was an appeal from a Court of Claims judgment in favor of
the United States in an Indian depredation suit involving John Friend's
allegations of personal injury and property damage by the Comanche
Indians.37 It appears from the petition filed in the Court of Claims that
Friend was represented by Attorney N. B. Coggeshall below and that
Lockwood assumed representation of Friend in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court dismissed Friend's appeal on 39September 19, 1895,
in light of the parties' mutual agreement to dismiss.
Lockwood also submitted a brief on behalf of claimants-petitioners,
Joseph Nesbitt and Charles Moore in Nesbitt v. United States in the
Court's 1901 Term. This was an appeal from a Court of Claims
judgment involving an Indian depredation claim for recovery of eighteen
mules and twenty-nine horses seized from the claimants by the Sioux
Indians.4' The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the case, but
considered only the question of what constituted proper evidence in
support of an Indian depredation claim filed originally with the Interior
Department pursuant to the governing statute. Deciding the appeal
without oral argument, the Court affirmed the Court of Claims judgment
dismissing Nesbitt and Moore's claim on the ground that they had not
submitted sufficient evidence to establish their Indian depredation
claim.42
35. Id.
36.
37.

163 U.S. 687 (1895).
See Claimants' Petition at 1, Friend (Indian Depredation, No. 3379). The

petition was filed by Attorney N. B. Coggeshall on July 20, 1891.

It describes the

property damage alleged to have been suffered by Friend at the hands of the Comanche

Indians. Although this petition was filed in the action before the Court of Claims, it is
contained in the Supreme Court records for this case (163 U.S. 687), which are on file in
the National Archives.
38. See id.
39. See Friend, 163 U.S. at 687. The parties' stipulation of dismissal, signed by

Lockwood and the Assistant Attorney General "in charge of the defense of Indian
Depredations," is contained in the Supreme Court records for this case, on file in the
National Archives.
40. 186 U.S. 153 (1902).
41. See Claimants' Petition at 1, Nesbitt v. United States (Indian Depredation, No.
2735). The petition was filed in the Court of Claims on June 23, 1891. It is contained in
the Supreme Court records for this matter (186 U.S. 153), which are on file in the
National Archives.
42. See Nesbitt, 186 U.S. at 155-57.

Lastly, Lockwood filed a brief and presented oral argument as the sole
legal representative of the Eastern and Emigrant Cherokees in the
Court's 1905 Term in United States v. Cherokee Nation.43 This appeal
followed protracted legislative and executive branch proceedings
concerning payment to the Cherokee Nation of a substantial sum in
consideration for its cession of territory east of the Mississippi as part of
the federal government's forced relocation scheme. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Claims judgment, awarding over one million
dollars with interest against the United States government and specifying
that payment be made to the Secretary of the Interior for disbursement to
the individual claimants, rather than to the Cherokee Nation directly.
The Court denied the Eastern and Emigrant Cherokees' petition, filed by
Lockwood, for payment of one-quarter of the total sum directly to the
Eastern and Emigrant Cherokees. The Court instead held that "they are
only entitled to receive the per capita payment with the Eastern
Cherokees, and should obtain that payment accordingly." 44
Mussey briefed at least three cases and argued one before the Supreme
Court. She was the only one of the four early female Supreme Court
litigators to succeed in persuading the Court to rule in her favor, and did
so in each of her cases before the Court. In Glavey v. United States,4
heard during the Court's 1900 Term, Mussey was joined on the brief
filed on behalf of Glavey by Robert D. Benedict, who presented oral
argument to the Court. This case, originally filed in the Court of
Claims," involved Glavey's claim for recovery of unpaid salary due him
as a steam vessel inspector commissioned by the U.S. Secretary of
Treasury. 47 The Court of Claims dismissed Glavey's claim, holding for
the defendant United States on the ground that Glavey's commission had
never become effective. On May 27, 1901, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the Court of Claims judgment, holding that Glavey was
entitled to compensation for services performed for the government as

an appointed special investigator of foreign steam vessels. '

43. 202 U.S. 101 (1906). Lockwood's oral argument was reported in the
Washington Post. See Mrs. Lockwood Argues Before Supreme Tribunal,WAsn. POST,
Jan. 18, 1906, at 9 (reporting, "First Time in History that the Justices Have Listened to
an Oral Argument From a Member of the Gentler Sex, Spoke Rapidly, but with
Clearness"). New research suggests that Lockwood's 1906 argument may have been her
second before the high court, the first being in Kaiser in 1880. See Cushman, supra note
30, at 3.
44. CherokeeNation, 202 U.S. at 132 (italics in original).
45. 182 U.S. 595 (1901).
46. See Plaintiff's Petition at 1-2, Glavey (No. 20790). Mussey filed the petition

on Glavey's behalf in the Court of Claims on May 22, 1897. The petition is contained in
the Supreme Court records for this case, which are on file in the National Archives.
47. See id.
48.

See Glavey, 182 U.S. at 610.
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Next, Mussey filed a brief as sole legal representative of Jose Casuela
Geigel during the Supreme Court's 1905 Term in La Compania de Los
Ferrocarrilesv. Geigel49 This case involved a contract claim filed by
Geigel in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.
Mussey's Supreme Court brief argued that the appeal should be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the claim involved less than
the required minimum amount in controversy. 0 The Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal, with costs granted to Geigel, on December 6,

1905'

Lastly, Mussey briefed and argued Shelton v. King 2 in the Court's
1912 Term. This was Mussey's first oral argument, and the second
presented by a woman in the Supreme Court. Several national
newspapers reported Mussey's achievement as the second woman
oralist' In this case, the Court upheld the validity of a testamentary
trust in favor of Mussey's client.m
Of all the early female Supreme Court bar members, Mussey was the
most active in moving the admission of other women, having moved the
Supreme Court bar applications of over twenty women between 1897
and 1920,"5 many of them affiliated with the Washington College of
Law, which she had founded together with Emma Gillett in 1898."
49. 199 U.S. 615 (1905); see Defendant in Error's Motion to Dismiss or to Affirm,
Geigel, 199 U.S. 615 (1905) (No. 280) (on file in the National Archives); Brief of
Defendant in Error in Support of Motion (on file in the National Archives).
50. See Defendant in Error's Motion to Dismiss or to Affirm at 4, Geigel, 199 U.S.
615 (1905) (No. 280) (on file in the National Archives) (stating that "[tihe motion to
dismiss the writ of error should be granted because the amount involved does not give
this Court jurisdiction, the judgment below being for a sum less than five thousand
dollars.").
51. See Geigel, 199 U.S. at 616.
52. 229 U.S. 90 (1913).

53. See, e.g., Second Learned Portia to Argue Before the U.S. Supreme Court,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1913, at 2 ("Mrs. Ellen Spencer Mussey, who is dean of the
Washington College of Law, yesterday won the distinction of being the second fair
Portia to argue a case before the United States Supreme Court."); Second Woman to
Argue at Supreme Court Bar, N.Y. TELE., Mar. 12, 1913; Second to Gain Distinction,

L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1913, at 3. Several local newspapers also covered the story. See,
e.g., Ellen Spencer Mussey Makes Oral Argument Before Supreme Court, WASH.
HERALD, Mar. 13, 1913; Distinctionfor Portia,WASH. STAR, Mar. 13, 1913.
54. See Shelton, 229 U.S. at 101.

55. See "Women Admitted to Practice in the Supreme Court of the United States,"
availablein the Supreme Court file, Supreme Court Library (listing 97 women admitted
to practice before the Supreme Court by 1920 and noting that Mussey sponsored 25 of

them).

56. See Clark, supra note 9, at 634.

V.

HIGHLIGHTS OF PROFESSIONAL ACTVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF
EARLY WOMEN MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT BAR

What follows are highlights of the professional activities and
achievements of the first twenty women members of the Supreme Court

bar, with a particular focus on the thirteen women about whom most is
known from primary and secondary sources. These women are Ada
Bittenbender, Myra Bradwell, Clara Shortridge Foltz, J. Ellen Foster,
Emma Gillett, Laura DeForce Gordon, Carrie Burnham Kilgore, Belva
Lockwood, Catharine Waugh McCulloch, Alice Minick, Ellen Spencer
Mussey, Marilla Ricker, and Lelia Robinson-Sawtelle. These women
were recognized, in their day and thereafter, as leading women lawyers
both in terms of their professional accomplishments and strides in
breaking down barriers to women's entry into the legal profession.57
Bittenbender was the first woman to join the Nebraska bar, in 1882,
and was an active courtroom litigator in partnership with her husband.
Bittenbender served as General Secretary of the Woman's International
Bar Association, the purposes of which were to open law schools to
women, remove all disabilities to admission of women to the bar, secure
their eligibility to the bench, disseminate knowledge concerning
woman's legal status, and secure better legal conditions for women.58
Bittenbender was also active in the women's temperance movement,
serving as legislative director of the Nebraska chapter of the Woman
Christian Temperance Union ("WCTU")59 and as legal adviser to the
Department of White Cross and White Shield of the WCTU's national
In both positions, she was responsible for drafting
organization.'
57. See, e.g., Bittenbender, WoMAN's WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 21, at 222-44
(describing achievements of Bradwell, Foltz, Gordon, Kilgore, Lockwood, and
McCulloch); Ada M. Bittenbender, Woman in Law, in 2 CI. LAW TIMES 301-09
(Catharine V. Waite ed., 1888) (same) [hereinafter Bittenbender, Cm. LAW TIMEs];
Belva A. Lockwood, Women of the American Bar, in 1 MONTHLY ILLUS. AM. 45-47

(1891-92) (addressing achievements of early women lawyers, with particular focus on
first seven women members of Supreme Court bar); Ellen Martin, Admission of Women
to the Bar, in 1 Cmi. LAW TIMEs 76-92 (Catharine V. Waite ed., 1887) (chronicling
efforts of Bradwell, Foltz, Foster, Gordon, Kilgore, Lockwood, McCulloch, and
Robinson-Sawtelle to join their states' bars); Lelia J. Robinson, Women Lawyers in the
United States, in 2 THE GREEN BAG 10 (Horace W. Fuller ed., 1890) (noting
achievements of many of these early women lawyers). These women's achievements
were also chronicled in Myra Bradwell's Chicago Legal News. See, e.g., Mrs.
Lockwood's Case, CHi. LEGAL NEws, June 20, 1874, at 315; Women as Lawyers, Cm.
LEGAL NEws, May 11, 1878, at 271-72.
58. See Bittenbender, CH. LAW TIMES, supra note 57, at 305.
59. See Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn At Last": Rape Reform in Late
Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 35-36 (1997) (noting some of
Bittenbender's legislative activities on behalf of the women's temperance movement).
60. See Frank L. Byrne, Ada Matilda Cole Bittenbender,in 1 NOTABLE AMERICAN
WOMEN, supra note 15, at 154 (hereinafter Byrne, Bittenbender).
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legislation and testifying before legislative bodies.6 ' Bittenbender ran
for a judgeship on the Nebraska Supreme Court on the Prohibition party

ticket in 1891, garnering five percent of the vote, 2 She authored the
"Woman in Law" chapter of Annie Nathan Meyer's important study,
Woman's Work in America, published in 1891,6 which was an expanded
version of her earlier article by the same title, published in Catharine V.
Waite's Chicago Law Times in 1888. 6' In both pieces, Bittenbender
highlighted the activities of early women lawyers.
Bradwell is famous primarily for her unsuccessful efforts to join the
Illinois bar in the late 1860s and for the Supreme Court's 1873 decision
in her case, in which it declared that membership in a state's bar was not
a privilege of citizenship protected by the recently ratified Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 In an unpublished decision in 1869, the Illinois Supreme
Court refused to admit Bradwell to its bar on the grounds that, as a
married woman, she could neither make, nor be bound by, contracts with
her clients, and therefore could not represent them as an attorney. 66
Bradwell pressed her bar application further,67 and the Illinois Supreme
Court issued a written opinion in 1870, asserting more broadly that
Bradwell had no right to practice law because she was a woman. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed that decision in 1873, concluding
that the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to admit Bradwell to its bar did
not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because admission to a state's bar was not a privilege of
citizenship protected by the U.S. Constitution. 9 Concurring in the
judgment, Justice Bradley declared it unnatural for a woman to pursue a
profession:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
61.

See id.

62.

See 4 THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 808 (Susan B. Anthony & Ida

Husted Harper eds., 1902) [hereinafter HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFAGE].
63. See Bittenbender, WOMAN'S WORKIN AMERICA, supranote 21, at 218.
64.
65.
66.

See Bittenbender, Ciii. LAW TIMES, supra note 57, at 301.
See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873).
The Illinois Supreme Court's unpublished decision is summarized in that

court's subsequent published opinion in the same case. See In re Bradwell, 55 111. 535
(1869).

67. Bradwell's multiple petitions to the Illinois Supreme Court are contained in the

Appendix to her Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1873), petitionfor cert.filed (U.S. Oct. 1871) (No. 487).

68. See Bradwell,5511. at 535.
69. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 139.

difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is,
or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood.70

Thus, Bradley relied upon the then-popular separate spheres ideology to
justify Bradwell's exclusion from the bar.
During the pendency of Bradwell's appeal to the Supreme Court, Alta

Hulett, another Illinois woman, successfully lobbied the Illinois
legislature to enact a statute, in 1872, authorizing women's admission to
that state's bar.7' Hulett then became the first woman to join Illinois'
bar. Bradwell did not join her state's bar until 1890. Indeed, she did not
practice law following the Supreme Court's ruling in her case. Instead,
she concentrated on publishing and editing the Chicago Legal News,

which she had founded in 1868.72
Foltz and Gordon successfully lobbied for enactment of a "woman
lawyer's bill" in California in 1878, which authorized women to practice
law in that state." Thereafter, they were the first two women to attend
the Hastings College of Law, registering for classes in 1879. Upon

being informed that Hastings had "resolved not to admit women," Foltz
and Gordon secured admission by suing the University of California
over Hastings' exclusion of women.
In ruling that Hastings was
obliged to admit women, the California Supreme Court declared that
"[flemales are entitled, by law, to be admitted as attorneys and
counsellors in all the courts of this State, upon the same terms as
' In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned as follows:
males."75

The College was founded for the purpose of affording instruction to those who
desire to be admitted, as well as those who have been admitted, to practice as
attorneys and counsellors. It was affiliated with the University, and thus
became an integral part of it, and in our opinion became subject to the same
general provisions of the law, as are applicable to the University; and the same
general policy which admitted females as students of the University, opened to
them as well the doors of the College of the Law.76

70.
71.

Id. at 141 (Bradley, J.,
Swayne, J., and Field, J.,
concurring in judgment).
See BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK Er AL., SEx DIscRIMINATIoN AND THE LAW:
HISTORY, PRAcncE, AND THEORY 69 (2d ed. 1996).
72. See id. at 61 (noting founding of Chicago Legal News in 1868).
73. See Barbara Allen Babcock, ClaraShortridgeFoltz: "FirstWoman," 28 VAL.
U. L. REv. 1231, 1246-58 (1994).
74. See Foltz v. Hoge, 54 Cal. 28 (1879); Babcock, supra note 73, at 1264-66,
1271-83.
75. Foltz, 54 Cal. at 35.

76. Id.
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Foltz became California's first woman lawyer when she joined that
state's bar in 1878, having studied for the examf while her lawsuit was
pending against the University of California! ' Gordon followed Foltz
into the California bar in 1879."' Both women became active litigators,
with significant criminal defense practices.
Foster was one of the first women members of the Iowa bar, joining in
1872."9 She was active in promoting women's causes, serving, for
example, as General Treasurer of the Woman's International Bar
Association." She was also involved in the women's temperance
movement and in Republican party politics. In the 1890s, Foster moved
to Washington, D.C., where she served on a number of presidential
commissions, worked briefly as an associate in Mussey's law office, and
became affiliated with Mussey and Gillett's Washington College of
Law, acting as both a trustee and an instructor."
Kilgore was the first woman to attend the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, entering in 1881 and graduating in 1883 after originally
being denied admission in 18712 She was also the first woman to join
the Pennsylvania bar in 1886, after having begun to read the law in 1865
with her future husband, Damon Kilgore. 3 In 1865, Kilgore had become
the first woman to earn an M.D. in New York. 4 She became the first
female master in chancery when she was appointed to that position in
Philadelphia in 1886.
Lockwood was one of the first two women to graduate from National
University Law School in Washington, D.C., in 1873, having petitioned

President Ulysses S. Grant, who also served as President of National
University, to issue her diploma.85 Three days after joining the Supreme
77. See, e.g., Babcock, supranote 73, at 1261.
78. See id.
79. Shortly before, Arabella Mansfield had joined the Iowa bar in 1869, thereby
becoming the first woman member of any state's bar. See Bittenbender, WOMAN's
WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 21, at 221-22.
80. See Bittenbender, CHI. LAW TIMES, supra note 57, at 305.
81. See Minutes of Washington College of Law Board of Trustees 3 (Apr. 2, 1898)
(on file with the Washington College of Law Archives), cited in Clark, supra note 9, at
661 n.266.
82. See Bittenbender, WOMAN'S WORKIN AMERICA, supra note 21, at 236.
83. See id.
84. See KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVIsEnLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN
AMERICA; 1638 TO THE PRESENT 223 (1986).
85. See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS AND THE ORIGINS OF
PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY IN AMERICA: THE LErrERS OF THE EQurry CLuB, 1887 TO 1890,
243 (1993). National University Law School, founded in 1869, was merged with George

Court bar, Lockwood became the first woman admitted to practice
before the bar of the U.S. Court of Claims,

practice.

6

where she had an active

Lockwood's business stationery emphasized her Court of

Claims and Supreme Court practices as follows:
Belva A. Lockwood,
Attorney and Solicitor,
619 F Street, N.W.
Practice before the United States Supreme Court, and Court of Claims.
PENSION, BOUNTY AND LAND CLAIMS A SPECIALTY, PATENTS
OBTAINED

The Supreme Court denied Lockwood's 1894 petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia to admit
her to practice law, declaring that the state court was best situated to

construe the terms of its statute governing admission of attorneys to its

bar.8 Lockwood was the first woman to present oral argument in the
Supreme Court when she argued on behalf of the Eastern and Emigrant
members of the Cherokee Nation in United States v. Cherokee Nation89
in 1906. Lockwood's trail-blazing oral argument was reported in the

Washington University in 1954. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION INAMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, 85 n.15 (1983).
86. Lockwood originally applied for membership in the Court of Claims bar in
1874. The Court of Claims refused to rule on her motion, however, holding that it had
no jurisdiction to do so because women, and, in particular, married women, were not fit
to practice law. The court stated:
It is to be understood that the decision of this court does not rest upon those
grounds which would make its judgment final. We do not, in legal effect, pass
upon the individual application before us, but refuse to act upon it for want of
jurisdiction.... The position which this court assumes is that under the laws
and Constitution of the United States a court is without power to grant such an
application, and that a woman is without legal capacity to take the office of
attorney.
May 11, 1874 Opinion of Court of Claims regarding bar membership application of
Belva A. Lockwood, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 23, 1874, at 277-78 (citing the opinion of
the Court of Claims, May 11, 1874, regarding the bar application of Belva A.
Lockwood).
Following the Court of Claims' refusal to act upon her bar membership application,
Lockwood petitioned Congress "to pass a declaratory act or joint resolution to the effect
'that no woman otherwise qualified shall be debarred from practice before any United
States court on account of sex or coverture."' Mrs. Lockwood's Case, CHI. LEGAL NEWs,
June 20, 1874, at 315.
In My Efforts to Become a Lawyer, Lockwood provided an engaging account of her
efforts to join the Court of Claims bar. See WOMEN N AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at
262. Lockwood ultimately joined the Court of Claims bar three days after joining the
Supreme Court bar, on March 6, 1879. See id. at 265.
87. Lockwood's business stationery is in the Supreme Court case records, on file
with the National Archives.
88. Seeln re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116,118 (1894).
89. 202 U.S. 101 (1906).
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Washington Post.90
McCulloch graduated from the Union College of Law, now
Northwestern University Law School, in 1886.9' Frustrated at her
inability to find legal work in Chicago, McCulloch moved to Rockford,
Illinois, where she established her own practice. While in Rockford, she
obtained her B.A. and M.A. at the Rockford Female Seminary, having
written her master's thesis on women's wages. Following her marriage
in 1890, McCulloch returned to Chicago, where she and her husband
opened a two-person law practice.2 McCulloch was active with the
International Council of Women and the International Women's Bar
Association, both formed in Washington, D.C., in 1888. She was also
president of the illinois Women's Bar Association from 1916 to 1920. 9'
McCulloch became the first female justice of the peace when she was
elected to that position in Evanston, Illinois, in 1907, serving until
1913. 94
Minick entered the legal profession following the death of her
husband. She attended the University of Nebraska Law School,
graduating in 1892. Like Bittenbender, who also hailed from Nebraska,
Minick was active in the women's temperance movement, serving as a
delegate to the International Women's Christian Temperance Union.95
Mussey and Gillett founded the first law school by and for women in
the United States when they incorporated the Washington College of
Law ('WCL") in 1898," after teaching law to women for two years
under the auspices of the Woman's Law Class, established in 1896. 9,
Mussey was the first dean of WCL, and Gillett the second. Together,
they were the first two female deans of an American law school."
90. See Court Hears Woman: Mrs. Lockwood Argues Before Supreme Tribunal,
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1906, at 9.

91.

Ada Kepley, the first American woman to obtain a law degree, graduated from

the Union College of Law in 1870. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN INLAW 50 (2d
ed. 1993).
92.

See DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 252-53.

93.

See Paul S. Boyer, Catharine Gouger Waugh McCulloch, in 2 NOTABLE

AMmiCAN WOMEN, supra note 15, at 460 (hereinafter Boyer, McCulloch).

94. See Boyer, McCulloch, supra note 93, at 460.
95. See MORELLO, supra note 84, at 111.
96. See Washington College of Law Board of Trustees, Certificate of
Incorporation of the Washington College of Law (Apr. 2, 1898) (on file with
Washington College of Law Archives).
97. See Clark, supranote 9, at 633.
98. See, e.g., Minutes of Washington College of Law Board of Trustees 8 (Aug. 3,
1898) (naming Mussey as first dean of the law school) (on file with Washington College

Gillett worked on behalf of married women's property rights, helping

to draft married women's property legislation for Washington, D.C., in
1893 and continuing to work on it until its enactment in 1896. Gillett
founded the Wimodaughsis ("Wives-Mothers-Daughters-Sisters"),an all

women's club, in 1890, which was committed to "helping younger
working women further their education .... ."' Gillett served on the
Wimodaughsis board with Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, the woman's
suffrage leader and minister, who was Susan B. Anthony's successor as
head of the
National American Woman Suffrage Association
0

(NAWSA). 1

Like Gillett, Mussey advocated married women's property rights,
which she helped to secure through the 1896 enactment of a statute in

Washington, D.C., known as the Mussey Act."

Much later, Mussey

advocated women's right to serve on juries.04 In 1927, a bill was
enacted allowing women to serve on juries, but "allow[ing] women to be
excused from jury service merely upon their request to be excused."'0 4
Ricker obtained the highest score on the bar examination when she

joined the District of Columbia bar in 1883, after reading law with

Riddle.0 5 In 1884, Ricker became the first woman to serve as a U. S.

Commissioner in Washington, D.C., a quasi-judicial role.'06 Picker

practiced law with Lockwood for several years in Washington. In the

1890s, Ricker became the first woman to practice law in New
Hampshire.
Robinson-Sawtelle was the first woman graduate of Boston University

Law School, in 1881, and the first woman to join the Massachusetts bar,
in 1882.07 When the Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court refused
of Law Archives); Minutes of Washington College of Law Board of Trustees 1 (July 26,
1913) (naming Gillett as second dean of the law school) (on file with Washington
College of Law Archives); Memorial to Emma M. Gillett, THE COLLEGE GRIT, May 12,
1928, at 1 (summarizing history of the Washington College of Law).
99. See Dorothy Thomas, Emma Millinda Gillett, in 2 NOTABLE AMERICAN
WOMEN, supra note 15, at 37 [hereinafter Thomas, Gillett].
100. Id.
101. See GLORIA MOLDOW, WOMEN DOCTORS IN GILDED-AGE WASHINGTON: RACE,
GENDER, AND PROFESSIONALIZATION 140-41 (1987).
102. See Dr. Ellen Mussey Rites Tomorrow, WASH. EVE. STAR, Apr. 22, 1936, at
A9. Lockwood worked with Mussey and Gillett on the married women's property
legislation in Washington. See 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 62, at 569.
103. See Founder of First Women's School of Law in Capital Seeks Equal Jury
Rights, N.Y. EvE. TELE., Mar. 2, 1922 (reporting Mussey's fight to make women eligible
for jury service).
104.

GRACE HATHAwAY, FATE RIDES A TORTOISE: A BIOGRAPHY OF ELLEN SPENCER

MUSSEY 198 (1937) (official biography of Mussey published by the Washington College
of Law).
105. See id.
106. See MORELLO, supra note 84, at 222.
107. See Bittenbender, WOMAN'S WORKIN AMERICA, supranote 21, at 228-29.
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Robinson-Sawtelle's original application for admission, ' °3 she
successfully lobbied the Massachusetts legislature to enact a statute
providing for women's membership in that state's bar on the same terms
as men, just as Lockwood had done for the Supreme Court bar.' She
then reapplied for admission, becoming Massachusetts' first woman
lawyer. Along with Boston University law student Mary Greene,
Robinson-Sawtelle lobbied the Massachusetts legislature to enact a
statute authorizing women to serve as commissioners, thereby allowing
women to "take affidavits, and to issue summonses for witnesses.""

Soon thereafter, Robinson-Sawtelle became Massachusetts' first woman
commissioner. In 1886, Robinson-Sawtelle published a primer on basic
legal principles for laypersons, entitled Law Made Easy, which she
publicized by travelling throughout the United States on a speaking
circuit."' In 1889, Robinson-Sawtelle published a book on family law,
entitled The Law of Husband and Wife." 2 She served as the U.S.
Secretary to the Woman's International Bar Association."3
In addition to these thirteen women, the Pier family of lawyers,
consisting of a mother and her three daughters, practiced law with their
husband/father, Colonel C.K. Pier, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin."4 The
Pier women had embarked upon their legal careers by combining
apprenticeships with attendance at law school."5 Likewise, Kate Kane
combined reading law in an attorney's office with attendance at the
University of Michigan Law School. Kane originally practiced law in
Janesville and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 6but subsequently moved to
Chicago, where she continued to practice."
108. See Robinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376, 376 (1881) (holding that "an unmarried
woman is not entitled to be examined for admission as an attorney and counsellor of this
court.").

109. See Robinson, supra note 57, at 30 (describing her own efforts in
Massachusetts legislature).
110. Letter from Mary A. Greene to the Equity Club (May 22, 1889), reprinted in
DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 163.
111.

LELiA JOSEPHINE ROBINSON, LAW MADE EASY: A BOOK FOR THE PEOPLE

(1886).
112.

LELiA JOSEPHINE ROBINSON, TmE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE (1889).

113. See Bittenbender, CHI. LAw TIMES, supra note 57, at 305.
114. See "Attorneys at Law," The Woman's Journal, at C-2 (Feb. 17, 1900)
(highlighting the achievements of the Pier family of lawyers of Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
including the February, 1900 Supreme Court bar admission of Kate Pier and her
daughter Harriet H. Pier).
115. See Bittenbender, WoMAN's WORKIN AMERICA, supranote 21, at 240.

116.

See Martin, supra note 57, at 84. As for Clara L. Power, it would appear that

There are at least four points of commonality that help to shed light on
these women's reasons for joining the Supreme Court bar. These points
of commonality are their similarities in educational, professional,
personal, and law practice experiences, their active involvement in the
woman suffrage movement, their membership in the Equity Club and
common themes addressed in their correspondence, and their
consciousness of being first women lawyers and their thoughts about the
unique issues and obligations which that status conferred. These themes
will be explored in the balance of this Article.
VI. SDMiLARrms IN EDUCATIONAL, PROFESSIONAL, PERSONAL, AND
LAW PRACTICE EXPERIENCES
The backgrounds of these women parallel one another in significant
respects in terms of their educational, professional, personal, and law
practice experiences.
A.

Parallelsin Educationaland ProfessionalExperiences Priorto
Entering the Legal Profession
1.

Attendance at Female Seminaries or Normal Schools
and Service as Teachers

In keeping with the growth in women's higher education opportunities
in the mid to late nineteenth century, nine of these early Supreme Court
bar members attended female seminaries or normal schools'17 prior to
entering the legal profession.
These women were Bittenbender,
Bradwell, Foltz, Foster, Gillett, Lockwood, Mussey, McCulloch, and
Ricker. Likewise, nine of these women-Bittenbender, Bradwell, Foltz,
Foster, Gillett, Kilgore, Lockwood, Mussey, and Ricker-taught school
before becoming lawyers.
Their educational experiences were as follows. Bittenbender attended
normal schools in Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., and taught at a
normal school in Pennsylvania, later serving as principal of the normal
school's model school. She also taught in a normal school upon moving
she was an 1893 graduate of Boston University Law School, which makes it likely that
she was familiar with Robinson-Sawtelle's activities on behalf of women lawyers. See
David J. Seipp, 125th Anniversary Essay: Holmes's Path, 77 B.U. L. REv. 515, 547

n.221 (1997) (noting Power as 1893 graduate). Finally, there is no information regarding

the professional activities and achievements of Fannie O'Linn.
117. "Normal schools" were high schools devoted to teacher training. See generally
BARBARA MILLER SOLOMON, IN THE COMPANY OF EDUCATED WOMEN xviii, 12, 15-16

(1985); see also CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS,

(1994).
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to Nebraska following her marriage."' Like Bittenbender, Bradwell
taught school upon first graduating from a female seminary. Partially in
response to the low wages paid her as a woman teacher, Bradwell quit
teaching and entered the legal profession by apprenticing in her
husband's law office." 9 Foltz attended a female seminary between the
ages of eleven and fourteen, and then taught school briefly before
marrying at age fifteen."' Foster attended the Charlestown Female
Seminary, followed by the
Genesee Wesleyan Seminary. She taught
2
school briefly thereafter. '
Gillett taught in the Pennsylvania public schools for ten years before
becoming a lawyer.' Like Bradwell, Gillett left teaching in frustration
over the low wages paid single women teachers. Gillett was motivated
to enter the legal profession in part by Lockwood's efforts to join the
Supreme Court bar in the late 1870s, which garnered national
attention.'"
Kilgore began teaching school when she was fifteen. Soon thereafter,
she continued her education at a female seminary, "where she was one
of two girls who took the classical course.' ' Following seminary,
Kilgore taught for five years in several Wisconsin schools, "where she
held classes in physiology and drawing as well as in the classics."'24 She
received her medical degree in 1865, and worked for one summer as an
assistant physician. Thereafter, she moved to Philadelphia, where she
taught gymnastics in the local schools and ran a "French School for
Young Ladies."'"
Lockwood attended a female seminary and taught school, while
McCulloch-' graduated from a female seminary, but did not teach.
Mussey attended, but did not graduate from, several female seminaries.
Thereafter, Mussey served as an administrator of the Women's
Department at the Spencerian Business College of Washington, D.C.,
118.

See Byrne, Bittenbender,supra note 60, at 153-54.
See JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA'S FIRST WOMAN LAWYER: THE BIOGRAPHY
OF MYRA BRADWELL 17-18 (1993).
120. See Corinne L. Gilb, Clara Shortridge Foltz, in 1 NOTABLE AMERICAN
WOMEN, supranote 15, at 641 (hereinafter Gilb, Foltz).
121. See Frank L. Byrne, Judith Ellen Horton Foster, in 1 NOTABLE AMERICAN
WOMEN, supra note 15, at 651 [hereinafter Byrne, Foster].
122. See Thomas, Gillett, supranote 99, at 36-37.
123. Dorothy Thomas, CarrieBurnham Kilgore, in 2 NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN,
supra note 15, at 329 [hereinafter Thomas, Kilgore].
124. Id. at 330.
125. Id.

119.

founded by her father. Finally, Ricker began teaching when she was
sixteen, and attended a teacher training academy for one year in her
early twenties."
Their attendance at female seminaries, normal schools, and other
teacher training academies, along with their service as teachers, was
consistent with the experiences of many women in the mid to late

nineteenth century.
2.

Experience as Journalists

As distinct from the substantial number of women who taught prior to
entering the law, only three served as journalists before becoming
lawyers. These women were Bittenbender, Gordon, and RobinsonSawtelle. That they were journalists suggests an engagement with
contemporary events. Indeed, they used their publications to further the
cause of woman suffrage through editorials and news reportage.
Bittenbender was active in journalism in Nebraska, editing a
newspaper owned by her husband before apprenticing in his law
office.'2 Gordon was active in journalism in California throughout the
1870s, publishing and editing two newspapers, which she used to further
the cause of woman suffrage.' Gordon met Foltz in 1878 when Gordon
covered Foltz's efforts on behalf of the woman lawyer's bill in
California. Finally, Robinson-Sawtelle worked for several
Boston
29
newspapers before entering Boston University Law School.1
B.

ParallelThemes in PersonalLives

Like many early women lawyers, a significant number of the early
female Supreme Court bar members practiced with their lawyerhusbands, either as apprentices or upon graduation from law school. 3 '
Aspiring women lawyers might have chosen to apprentice in the law
offices of their husbands or fathers at this time because they were
excluded from other legal apprenticeship opportunities.' Additionally,
126. See Thomas, supra note 15, at 154.
127. See DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 211.
128. See Babcock, supra note 73, at 1248-49; see also DRACHMAN, supra note 85,
at 226.
129. See DRACHMIAN, supra note 85, at 257.
130. Noting that many of the first women lawyers entered the legal profession by
studying and practicing with their lawyer-husbands, D. Kelly Weisberg has observed, "In

1890 approximately one-third of the total number of women lawyers were married

women and more than half this number were married to lawyers." D. Kelly Weisberg,
Barredfrom the Bar: Women andLegal Educationin the UnitedStates, 1870-1890, 28 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 485, 494-95 (1977).

131.

See EPSrmIN, supra note 91, at 33.
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working for a family member helped to resolve potential conflicts
between femininity and professionalism experienced by early women
lawyers, including issues of working outside of the home in the public
sphere.
Of this early group, Bittenbender, Bradwell, Kilgore,
McCulloch, and Mussey practiced law with their husbands, who were
supportive of their wives' legal careers.
Bittenbender's lawyer-husband, Henry C. Bittenbender, trained her in
the law and encouraged her to engage in courtroom litigation. In a letter
to the Equity Club, Bittenbender described the understanding that she
and her husband had reached to pursue a companionate, celibate
marriage, thereby avoiding the threat of unwanted pregnancies which
might undermine her physical stamina for working in the law.
Bittenbender and her husband had no children.132
While Bradwell did not practice law following the Supreme Court's

1873 decision in her case, she had entered the legal profession by
apprenticing in her husband's law office. Her husband, James Bradwell,
was also supportive
of her legal publishing endeavors with the Chicago
33
Legal News.'
Kilgore entered the legal profession by apprenticing in her husband's
office before they were married. In anticipation of their marriage, they
entered into an "ante-nuptial contract," or pre-nuptial agreement,
through which they agreed not to be bound by any laws handicapping
married women's property rights. Kilgore's husband, Damon Kilgore,
was supportive of her law practice and her efforts to overcome barriers
to women's opportunities in the legal profession in Pennsylvania.
McCulloch's husband, Frank McCulloch, a fellow graduate of the
Union College of Law, was supportive of her legal career and suffrage
activities.'4 Together, they practiced law at McCulloch & McCulloch in
Chicago, commuting together from their home in Evanston, Illinois,
where they shared housekeeping duties and responsibilities for their four
children.
Like Bittenbender, Bradwell, and Kilgore, Mussey entered the practice
of law by apprenticing in her husband's law practice. Ellen and R. D.
Mussey practiced law together for approximately sixteen years between
132. See Byrne, Bittenbender,supra note 60, at 153.
133. See Dorothy Thomas, "Myra Colby Bradwell," in 1 Notable American Women,
supra note 15, at 224 (hereinafter Thomas, Bradwell).
134. See Letter from Catharine Waugh McCulloch to the Equity Club (Nov. 8,
1890), reprintedin DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 192.

1876 and 1892, with Mussey running the law practice from their home

between 1876 and 1878 while nursing her husband who was ill with
malaria. Unlike most of the lawyer-husbands of the other early female
Supreme Court bar members, Mussey's husband was active in the
Supreme Court bar, filing briefs and sponsoring the membership of other

attorneys. He served as counsel of record in at least sixteen cases
between 1871 and 1892,35 and sponsored the membership of at least
seven men between 1885 and 1892.136 He died before Mussey became a

member of the District of Columbia bar, and therefore did not move her
application for admission to the Supreme Court bar. Indeed, it would

appear that Mussey did not feel compelled to join any bar until her
husband died in 1892, at which time she assumed full responsibility for
running the law practice and joined the District of Columbia bar.'37 In an

effort to join the local bar without taking a written examination, Mussey
applied for admission to several Washington, D.C., law schools, where
graduation from law school provided a "diploma privilege" at that time,
securing admission to the bar without the need to take a bar exam.
Mussey's law school applications were rejected because of her sex, and
she instead arranged an oral administration of the bar examination in her
home, which she passed. Mussey's most active and successful years as a
lawyer followed her husband's death.'38
By contrast, Foltz, Foster, Gordon, and Robinson-Sawtelle entered the
legal profession after being divorced. Foltz married at age fifteen and
quickly had five children. She divorced her husband in 1879following his affair with another woman-although she is recorded in
some official documents as having been widowed.'39 While her divorce
135. R. D. Mussey was listed as counsel of record in the following Supreme Court
cases: Philip v. Nock, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 185 (1871); Railroad Co. v. Church, 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 62 (1873); Philip v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460 (1873); Trist v. Child, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 441 (1874); Wright v. Tebbitts, 91 U.S. 252 (1875); Baltimore &
Potomac Railroad Co. v. Trustees of Sixth Presbyterian Church, 91 U.S. 127 (1875);
Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878); Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 154 U.S. 656
(1879); Hitz v. National Metropolitan Bank, 111 U.S. 722 (1884); Gilbert v. Moline
Plough Co., 119 U.S. 491 (1886); Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker, 122 U.S. 635 (1887);
Benziger v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 211 (1887); Hitz v. Jenks, 123 U.S. 297 (1887); In re
ChateaugayOre and Iron Co., 128 U.S. 544 (1888); Bradford v. Miller, 140 U.S. 674
(1890); and ChateaugayOre & Iron Co. v. Blake, 144 U.S. 476 (1892).
136. See Supreme Court Attorney Rolls, Vol. 4 (1884 Term-1897 Term) (on file
with the National Archives).
137. Until such time as she could be admitted to the District of Columbia bar,
Mussey hired a male associate, Jacob H. Lichliter, who handled the necessary court
appearances in her stead. See Announcement of Ellen Spencer Mussey (June 13, 1892)
(on file with Washington College of Law Archives), quoted in Clark, supra note 9, at
620.
138. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 624 & n.47.
139. See Babcock, supra note 73, at 1259.
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was proceeding, Foltz briefly apprenticed and then attended the Hastings
College of Law, with her parents looking after her children. Like Foltz,
Gordon divorced her husband in 1878 upon discovering his affair with
another woman. Gordon did not have any children by this marriage.' 40
Subsequent to the demise of their first marriages, Foster and
Robinson-Sawtelle both married men who were supportive of their legal
careers.1' Foster married a lawyer, who supervised her as she read law
for admission to the Iowa bar.12 Robinson-Sawtelle divorced her first
husband for adultery in 1877 and enrolled in law school the following
year. She remarried in 1890 and took her honeymoon vacation in
Washington, D.C., where she was admitted to the Supreme Court bar.43
Robinson-Sawtelle noted in a letter to the Equity Club, "My husband is
proud of my professional ambition and does everything that a husband
can do to encourage and sustain me in it. His wedding present was a
fine new roll-top desk for my office....,,"'44 Robinson-Sawtelle died
one year after her remarriage at the age of forty-one. 45
As for the others, Lockwood was twice widowed, once before she

attended law school and once after she had been practicing law for
several years."4 Ricker was also widowed, in 1868, long before joining
the District of Columbia bar in 1882."4 At age 23, Ricker had married a
man more than thirty years her senior. Upon his death five years later,
Ricker inherited $50,000. Without any children to limit her, Ricker
traveled in Europe for four years, where she was exposed to ideas of
political equality and birth control and became an adherent of the free
thought movement.4' Minick was widowed at age 43, and soon
thereafter entered law school.4 9 Gillett neither married nor had children.
Instead, she moved to Washington, D.C., to study law as a single woman
in 1880, lived temporarily in Lockwood's home, studied pension law as
an apprentice in Lockwood's office, and attended Howard Law School
140.

See Corinne L. Gilb, Laura DeForce Gordon, in 2 NOTABLE AMERICAN

WOMEN, supra note 15,

at 69.

141. See, e.g., Letter from Lelia Robinson Sawtelle to the Equity Club (Sept. 18,
1890), reprintedin DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 200.
142. See Byrne, Foster,supra note 121.
143. See DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 261.
144. Letter from Robinson Sawtelle, supra note 141, at 200-01.
145. See DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 261.
146. See Filler, Lockwood, supra note 17, at 414.
147. See Thomas, Ricker, supra note 15.
148. See id.
149. See MoRELLo, supra note 84, at 111.

at night.5
Thus, of these thirteen women, one remained single throughout her
professional life (Gillett); four were widowed when they achieved their
greatest successes in the legal profession (Lockwood, Minick, Mussey,
and Ricker); six were married to men who apprenticed them and/or
served as their law partners (Bittenbender, Bradwell, Foster, Kilgore,
McCulloch, and Mussey); and four were divorced when they entered the
legal profession (Foltz, Foster, Gordon, and Robinson-Sawtelle). As
these biographical highlights reveal, these women were able to achieve
success in the legal profession at least in part because their personal lives
and marital statuses allowed them to concentrate on their careers in a
manner akin to the traditional male model.
Also contributing to their ability to pursue their careers with
concentrated energy and drive was the relative absence of children. Four
of these women had no children (Bittenbender, Gillett, Ricker, and
Robinson-Sawtelle); two had one child apiece (Gordon, who adopted her
nephew, and Lockwood, whose daughter was grown by the time
Lockwood entered the legal profession); and two had two children each
(Bradwell and Kilgore). Only Foltz, Foster, McCulloch, and Mussey
had more than two children: Foltz had five; Foster had a total of four
children by two husbands, with each of her two daughters dying at the
age of five; McCulloch had four; and Mussey had four, including two

children from her widower-husband's prior marriage. Two of Mussey's
four children had died, however, by the time she joined the District of
Columbia bar after her husband's death.' As for Minick, it is unclear
whether she had any children, but she did not enter law school until after
her husband's death, following twenty-four years of marriage. 2 If
Minick had had any children, they likely would have been grown by the
time she entered law school. This relative absence of children, as
compared with the circumstances of women generally, enabled these
women to devote time and energy to pursuing their careers in conformity
with the traditional male model of lawyering.
C. Similaritiesof Experience in Enteringthe Legal Profession
1.

Reasonsfor Entering the Legal Profession

These women entered the legal profession for at least three main
reasons. First, they entered the law as a rebellion against separate
150.
151.
152.

See Thomas, Gillett,supra note 99.
See Clark, supra note 9, at 620 & n.36.
See MORELLo, supranote 84, at 111.
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spheres ideology, which had isolated them in the domestic realm or in
"feminine" professions, such as teaching, that paid low wages and
relegated them to low status. Second, they discovered that they enjoyed
the practice of law by working in their lawyer-husbands' offices. Third,
they were passionate about women's rights issues and saw law as a
means to further their feminist goals. These parallels in their animating

impulses for entering the legal profession-rejection of separate spheres
ideology, identification with their lawyer-husbands, and commitment to
women's rights-help to shed light on why they later sought to join the
Supreme Court bar.
2. Attendance at Law School
It is not surprising that most of these women attended female
seminaries and taught school prior to entering the legal profession, given
the expansion of women's higher education opportunities in the mid to
late nineteenth century and growth in teaching as an acceptable field for
women wishing to engage in a career. Teaching was a means by which
to work outside of the home, but still remain within the feminine sphere,
where separate, gendered spheres prevailed in the nineteenth century
American/Victorian ideology. Nor is it surprising that these women
later rejected the separate spheres ideology in turning to the law as a
profession.
What is surprising, however, is that eight of these Supreme Court
women attended law school between 1870 and 1891, at a time when
most individuals entered the legal profession by apprenticing in a law
office rather than by attending law school.'53 These eight were Foltz,
Gillett, Gordon, Kilgore, Lockwood, McCulloch, Minick, and RobinsonSawtelle. Law schools were just beginning to be established at this time,
and the first law schools to admit women, the University of Iowa and
Washington University in St. Louis, did not do so until 1869.4 Thus,
when Lockwood enrolled at National University Law School in 1871,
and graduated in 1873, she was breaking new ground. In addition to

being one of the first two women to graduate from National,'55 she was
also on the cutting edge of women's attendance at law schools generally.
153.

See generally LAWRENCE M. FRiDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 606

(2d ed. 1985).
154. See WoMEN INLAW: A BIO-BmLIOGRAPHICAL SOURCEBOOK 5 (Rebecca Mae
Salokar & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 1996).
155. See DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 243.

The rise of the law school in the second half of the nineteenth century
had a tremendous impact upon women's entry into the legal

profession.'56 Writing about women in the law in 1891, Bittenbender

reported that thirty-one of fifty-six women lawyers in July, 1882, or

approximately fifty-five percent, had graduated from law school.'57
Thus, women were more likely to enter the legal profession by attending
law school than by apprenticing. In this light, the experience of these

early Supreme Court bar members is consistent with the overall pattern
of women's attendance at law school. 8
As a general matter, women entered the legal profession in this early
period by pursuing an egalitarian, integrationist model, while their
analogues in the medical profession adopted a gendered, separate

spheres approach.' 9

In other words, women broke into the legal

profession by invoking gender equality principles, while women broke

into the medical profession by following a gender-difference model.' 6'
Women sought access to law schools on the ground that women were

just as capable as men, while women gained admission to medical
schools on the theory that women's nurturing skills predisposed them to
certain fields of medicine, such as women's and children's health. As an
outgrowth of the different ideologies informing women's participation in
these two professions, women who attended law school did so at

coeducational law schools, while women who attended medical school
primarily attended single-sex medical schools. Attending law school
constituted a break with the past, both in terms of women's roles in
156. In 1850, there were fifteen law schools in the United States. By 1860, there
were twenty-one; thirty-one in 1870; fifty-one in 1880; sixty-one in 1890, and 102 by
1900. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 153, at 607.
157. See Bittenbender, WOMAN'S WORKIN AMERICA, supra note 21, at 231.
158. More women than men may have attended law school because they did not
have the same access to apprenticeship opportunities as men. Those women who did not
have fathers or husbands in the legal profession likely faced sex discrimination in
seeking apprenticeships. Moreover, women may have also been more likely than men to
enter the legal profession by attending law school because they were breaking with
tradition by becoming lawyers in the first place and their mode of entry reflected that
break.
159. See VRGnJIiA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAwYERS IN MODERN
A ErICAN HISTORY 2 (1998).
160. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women's Ways of "Knowing" Law:
Feminist Legal Epistemology, Pedagogy, and Jurisprudence, in KNOWLEDGE,
DIFFERENCE, AND POWER: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY WOMAN'S WAYS OF KNOWING

57-84

(Nancy Rule Goldberger et al. eds., 1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminization of the
Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers, in 3 LAWYERS IN

SOCIETY 196, 199-204 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995) (providing
overview of women's history in legal profession); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a
Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and
Social Change, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 289, 298-304 (1989) (illustrating difference in
women's entry into legal and medical professions).
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society and the traditions of the legal profession. Ultimately, their
attending law school was consistent with their overall pioneering spirit
in expanding opportunities for women in the legal profession.
3. Apprenticeship in Law Offices
Four of these women entered the legal profession solely by

apprenticing in their husband's law offices: Bittenbender, Bradwell,
Foster, and Mussey. Another woman, Ricker, read law with Riddle, the
white Howard law professor who moved the admission of several of the
early female Supreme Court bar members. Four women-Foltz, Gillett,
Kilgore, and McCulloch-combined attendance at law school with
apprenticeships. Foltz briefly apprenticed with a male attorney before
attending, although not graduating from, the Hastings College of Law.
Gillett attended Howard Law School at night while apprenticing with
Lockwood during the day.
Kilgore attended the University of
Pennsylvania Law School after having apprenticed in her future
husband's law office for approximately fifteen years. McCulloch read
law in an office for one year before matriculating at the Union College
of Law.
As noted above, that only five of these women entered the legal
profession solely through apprenticeships, suggests the extent to which
this group broke with the traditional mode of entry into the legal
profession. Other than this difference in mode of entry, however, it is
difficult to discern how the legal careers of the women who apprenticed
differed from those who attended law school. For example, those who
apprenticed were not distinguished in age from those who attended law
school. Thus, their reliance on the traditional mode of entering the law
cannot be explained by their membership in an earlier generation.
Moreover, their careers did not take different paths once they entered the
law. With regard to the four who combined apprenticeships with
attendance at law schools, their pattern may suggest a transition in
women's entry into the legal profession from one prevailing mode to
another.
D. Similaritiesin Law PracticeExperiences
By and large, these women had remarkably similar practice
experiences. Consistent with law practices of the time generally, they
worked in one or two person law offices, conducting individual client

representation in contract, estate, family, or property law matters, with

some criminal representation included.
As an example, Lockwood conducted a small law practice in
Washington, D.C., sometimes on a solo basis and at other times with

two women, including Ricker. The small size of their office was typical
of that era, although the all-female format was not. Like many attorneys
of their day, Lockwood represented clients in contract and property law
matters, while Ricker specialized in criminal law. What distinguished

Lockwood's practice from others was her active involvement in Court of
Claims litigation. 6'
Foltz was a solo practitioner, whose docket included contract, family,
and property law disputes, as well as criminal defense matters 2
Gordon was a solo practitioner, representing clients in contract disputes

and criminal matters.'

Like Foltz and Gordon, McCulloch represented

clients in contract and property matters.' 6'

Distinct from Foltz and

Gordon, however, McCulloch practiced in a two-person partnership with
her lawyer-husband.
Mussey's practice was typical in its small scale, though distinct in its
subject matter. Following her husband's death, she temporarily engaged
the services of an associate, Jacob Lichliter, until she became a member
of the District of Columbia bar. 6 Then, in 1896, she formed a brief
partnership with Foster. Otherwise, Mussey practiced on her own. Her
practice was distinctive in terms of types of cases. Having inherited the

law practice from her husband, Mussey's representation largely involved
private and public international law and commercial law matters. For
example, Mussey was counsel to the Norwegian and Swedish legations
161. See text accompanying notes 31-44, 87.
162. Generalizations about Foltz's docket are derived in part from an analysis of
California Supreme Court opinions in cases in which Foltz was listed as counsel of
record. Foltz was listed as counsel of record in the following cases: People v. Morrow,
60 Cal. 142 (1882); Taylor v. Bidwell, 4 P. 491 (Cal. 1884); Newman v. Smith, 18 P. 791
(Cal. 1888); Feeney v. Howard,21 P. 984 (Cal. 1889); People v. Wells, 34 P. 1078 (Cal.
1893); Matthai v. Kennedy, 84 P. 37 (Cal. 1906); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles
Independent Gas Co., 93 P. 1006 (Cal. 1908); Tubby v. Tubby, 260 P. 294 (Cal. 1927);
and Scott v. Beck, 266 P. 951 (Cal. 1928).
163. Information about Gordon's law practice is partially derived from an analysis
of California Supreme Court opinions in cases in which she appeared as an attorney.
Gordon was listed as counsel of record in the following cases: People v. Marshall,59
Cal. 391 (1881); and Steele v. Boardof Supervisors of Merced County, 62 Cal. 6 (1882).
See also Bittenbender, WOMAN'S WORK INAMERICA, supra note 21, at 239 (describing
Gordon's handling of criminal law matters).
164. Information about McCulloch's docket is gleaned in part from Illinois
Supreme Court opinions in appeals in which McCulloch was listed as counsel of record.

McCulloch was listed as counsel of record in the following cases: Pool v. Phillips,47
N.E. 758 (Ill. 1897); and Wiedeman v. Keller, 49 N.E. 210 (Il. 1897).
165. See Announcement of Ellen Spencer Mussey (June 13, 1892), cited in Clark,
supra note 9, at 620 & n.37.
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and to the American Red Cross.'o6 Like Mussey, Kilgore distinguished
herself in terms of the types of cases she handled, representing clients in

securities, bankruptcy, and trust matters, in addition to the more typical
disputes over contracts and wills.'67
Consistent with the experience of early women lawyers, and distinct
from that of lawyers generally, many of these women primarily drafted
documents within the confines of their law offices. They rarely
represented clients in court, as court appearances were principally
handled by their male law partners. For example, upon graduation from
Howard Law School, Gillett became an associate in the law office of
Watson J. Newton, whom she had met through her work as a notary
public." She served as Newton's associate for eighteen years before
forming a law partnership with him in 1900, and played a fairly
traditional female role within the law firm by performing office-based
drafting rather than courtroom representation.
While these women's law practices were generally consistent with that
of most attorneys of their day in terms of size and nature of practice, and
while their likelihood of drafting documents in the office, rather than
litigating in court, was consistent with the experience of most women
attorneys, four of these women engaged in courtroom litigation at a rate
disproportionate to the experience of most early women attorneys:
Bittenbender, Foltz, Lockwood, and Mussey, the same four who filed
briefs in the Supreme Court. That these four, and no others, fied briefs
in the Supreme Court may reflect their greater engagement in litigation
generally. Foltz had an active trial practice, with expertise in criminal
defense representation,' while Lockwood and Mussey's Supreme Court
166. See 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 62, at 574.
167. Generalizations about Kilgore's law practice are partially derived from an
examination of Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinions in cases in which Kilgore was
listed as counsel of record. Kilgore was listed as counsel of record in the following

cases: In re Harmony Lodge, 18 A. 10 (Pa. 1889); In re Foster, 21 A. 798 (Pa. 1891);
Germantown Brewing Co. v. Booth, 29 A. 386 (Pa. 1894); In re Harker, 31 A. 553 (Pa.

1895); In re Harker, 34 A. 927 (Pa. 1896); Weber v. Aschbacker, 55 A. 534 (Pa. 1903);
and Kase v. Burnham, 55 A. 1028 (Pa. 1903).
168. Speech by Ruth G. D. Havens, Emma M. Gillett, reprinted in THE CoLLGE

GRr, Oct. 22, 1922 (on file in the Washington College of Law Archives). Gillett was
the first female notary public in Washington, D.C.

169. As Weisberg has observed, "Of Miss Emma Gillet [sic] it was said, 'her work
has been principally in the office line-the drawing of papers, taking testimony in equity
causes and probate business, together with a large amount of notarial and some financial
work."' Weisberg, supranote 130, at 496 (providing no attribution for this observation).
170. See Gilb, Foltz, supra note 120, at 642.

litigation distinguished them from all other early women lawyers, and
from most lawyers generally. It should be noted, however, that
Mussey's 1913 oral argument in the Supreme Court represented a
significant advance in her law practice, which had consisted of
counseling clients and drafting documents within the confines of her law

office throughout her husband's tenure, in keeping with conventional
expectations of women's place outside of the public sphere.'
VII. ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT
Each of the thirteen Supreme Court bar members was active in the
woman suffrage movement,1 2 with ten playing leadership roles:
Bittenbender, Foltz, Foster, Gillett, Gordon, Kilgore, Lockwood,
McCulloch, Mussey, and Ricker. Their leadership of the movement is
evidenced, for example, by the frequency with which they are noted in
Volume IV of the History of Woman Suffrage, which covers the period
from 1883 to 1900, during which these first women joined the Supreme
Court bar.'
Officially christened at the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention, the woman
suffrage movement slackened during the Civil War period as many
women's rights supporters set their cause aside to support the republic
and the abolition of slavery. After the war, women's rights activists
expected to be rewarded for their loyal support by obtaining the right to
vote. Instead, women were told that this was the "Negro hour," and that
they must wait.' 74 The government's failure to recognize women's
wartime support, taken together with the Fourteenth Amendment's
introduction of the word "male" into the Constitution, caused the woman
suffrage movement to splinter in two directions. This fracture was
embodied in two organizations, both founded in 1869, the National
171.

See Clark, supra note 9, at 671 n.335.

172. For an introduction to the ideological background of the woman suffrage
movement, see ELLEN CAROL DuBois, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT INAMERICA, 1848-1869 (1978); ELEANOR FLEXNER

&

ELLEN FITZPATRICK, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE

THE UNITED STATES (1996); AInN S. KRADrrOR, THE IDEAS

MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1965); and ANNE FIROR Scowr AND ANDREW MACKAY ScoTr,
ONE HALF THE PEOPLE: THE FIGHTFOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE (1982).
173. See generally 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 62 (describing
activities of, and quoting, Bittenbender, Bradwell, Foster, Gillett, Gordon, Kilgore,
Lockwood, McCulloch, Mussey, Ricker and Robinson-Sawtelle). HISTORY OF WOMAN
SUFFRAGE is the official history of the woman suffrage movement, authored by its
leaders. Barbara Babcock has observed that many of the early women lawyers were
suffragists, stating, "By virtue of their efforts to join the profession, all of the first

women lawyers were, in effect, members of the women's movement. Rejection of
separate spheres was inherent in the project." Babcock, supra note 73, at 1285 n.223.
174. See KRADITOR, supra note 172, at 3 n.2.
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Woman Suffrage Association ("NWSA"), led by Elizabeth Cady Stanton
and Susan B. Anthony, which opposed the Fourteenth Amendment's
enfranchisement of freedmen in the absence of votes for women, and the
American Woman Suffrage Association ("AWSA"), led by Lucy Stone
and Julia Ward Howe, which supported the enfranchisement of freedmen

as an important step toward universal suffrage, even absent votes for
women.
In 1890, NWSA and AWSA merged to form the National American
Woman Suffrage Association ("NAWSA"), which focused exclusively
upon votes for women, leaving to its state affiliates the question of black
suffrage as a compromise to placate its southern members. While the
woman suffrage movement was primarily grounded upon a commitment
to gender equality, 76 it was nevertheless infected with racism, as
reflected in the NWSA/AWSA split and in NAWSA's compromise
position on black suffrage.'" The movement was also infected with
nativism and classism, as some suffragists argued that immigrant men,
who were largely members of the working class, should not get the vote
before native-born middle- and upper-class women.
As for the thirteen early women members of the Supreme Court bar,
Bittenbender was active in the woman suffrage movement as a founder
and president of the Nebraska Woman Suffrage Association.
Likewise, Foltz was a pioneering suffragist who lobbied for suffrage
bills in California, was president of the California Woman Suffrage
Association in the early 1880s,
and served as an elector on Lockwood's
7
Equal Rights ticket in 1884.1
Foster was active in speaking at woman suffrage meetings on behalf
of the Republican party, ' and is cited several times in Volume IV of the
History of Woman Suffrage.'8 ' Likewise, Gillett was active in the
175.
176.

See generallyFLExNER &FrrZPATRICK, supra note 172, at 145-48.
See, e.g., DuBois, supra note 172, at 20 (describing NWSA as "dedicated first

and foremost to securing political equality with men"); KRADrrOR, supra note 172, at 2

(suffrage was part of "movement for women's equality with men").

177. See KRADTOR, supra note 172, at 255-56 (noting racism in suffrage
movement).
178. See Byrne, Bittenbender, supra note 60, at 154.
179. As Babcock reveals, Foltz invoked anti-Chinese sentiment in her activities on
behalf of suffrage, employing nativistic arguments to urge the cause of votes for women.
See Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz: Constitution-Maker,66 IND. L.J.
849, 853-54 & n.14, 908-09 (1991).
180. See Byrne, Foster,supra note 121, at 652.
181. See, e.g., 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 62, at 19 (describing

woman suffrage movement, but most of her suffrage activities post-date
her admission to the Supreme Court bar in 1890. Thus, her suffrage
activities do not necessarily shed light on her reasons for joining the
Supreme Court bar. For example, Gillett served as recording secretary
of the District of Columbia Equal Suffrage Association from 1898 to
1906, as a delegate to NAWSA's national conventions," and on
NAWSA's finance committee in 1903-04 and congressional committee
After passage of the Nineteenth
in 1903 (chairing it in 1911)."
Amendment in 1920, guaranteeing women's right to vote, Gillett joined
the National Woman's Party and campaigned on behalf of a proposed
equal rights amendment. 8 In 1928, The College Grit, the Washington
College of Law's student newspaper, described Gillett as "an ardent

feminist, closely identified with the suffrage organizations, both local
and national, and a supporter of many movements tending to bring about
greater opportunities for women.' ' 5
Like Foltz, Gordon was active in the suffrage movement in California,
beginning in the 1870s. Her suffrage activities included lobbying the
state legislature and using her two newspapers to promote the cause. 8 6
Gordon followed Foltz as president of the California women's suffrage
organization in 1884, serving in that role for ten years.8 Gordon also
served as California's delegate to NWSA conventions."
Kilgore actively supported woman suffrage, both by representing
Philadelphia's women's suffrage organization at NWSA's conventions
in the 1870s, and by attempting to vote in Philadelphia in 1871. Kilgore
argued her own case before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after her
ballot was rejected on the basis of sex, despite her having registered to
vote and paid the poll tax.'89
Lockwood was active on the suffrage stump, frequently traveling to
speak in favor of woman suffrage."t ' Lockwood ran for president on the
Equal Rights ticket in 1884 and again in 1888, garnering a small, but not
Foster's appearance as representative of National Republican Committee at NWSA

Convention of 1884).

182. See Thomas, Gillett, supra note 99, at 37.

183. See id.
184. See id.

185. Memorial to Emma M. Gillett, TH- COLLEGE GRrr, May 12, 1928 (on file in
the Washington College of Law Archives).
186. See 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 62, at 57 (reporting on

Gordon's speech on suffrage efforts in California at NWSA's 1885 convention).
187. See id. at 478.
188.

See Corrine L. Gilb, Laura DeForce Gordon, in 2

WOMEN, supra note 15, at 69.

NOTABLE AMERICAN

189. See Thomas, Kilgore, supra note 123, at 330.
190. See, e.g., 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 62, at 640 (describing
Lockwood speaking in Kansas); id. at 939 (describing Lockwood speaking in Utah).
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insignificant, percentage of the vote. 9'

Lockwood is referenced

throughout Volume IV of the History of Woman Suffrage, beginning
with her speech at the NWSA Convention in 1884 22
McCulloch was actively engaged in the woman suffrage movement,
both in Illinois and nationally. She was president of the Illinois Equal4
Suffrage Association in 1899.29' She also served as NAWSA's auditor,'1
as well as its legal advisor from 1904 to 1911.195 McCulloch frequently
served as the Illinois delegate or spokesperson at national suffrage
meetings, where she was known for her speaking ability.96 McCulloch's
address at the 1900 NAWSA convention is excerpted at length in
Volume IV of the History of Woman Suffrage:
Women need the ballot not only for the honor of being esteemed peers among
freemen, but they want it for the practical value it will be in protecting them in
the exercise of a citizen's prerogatives....
But, it is asked, "Have not women had some sort of protection without the
ballot?" Yes, but it has been only such protection as the caprice or affection of
the voting class has given, gratuities revocable at will. The man of wealth or
power defends his wife, daughter or sweetheart because she is his, just as he
would defend his property. His own opinions, not her views, decide him
concerning the things from which she should be protected. Should she ever
need protection against "her protector," there is no one to give it....
Entrance into remunerative employments in many instances has been
denied women. In many of the States the professions of law, medicine,
dentistry and all the elective offices are closed by statute. Appointive positions,
also, which women might legally hold are practically withheld from them
because of their lack of the ballot. The appointing power-president, governor,
mayor, judge or commissioner-all owe their own positions to voters who

expect some minor appointment in acknowledgment of service. "

McCulloch's speech demonstrated not only the symbolic value of the
vote, but also its instrumental value as a means to elect representatives

who would promote women's interest in the professions. Immediately
191. See Dr. Louis Frank, The Woman Lawyer, 3 Cm. LAW TIMES 253, 266
(Catharine V. Waite ed., 1889).
192. See 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supranote 62, at 18.
193. See id. at 598.
194. See id. at 602.
195. See Boyer, McCulloch, supra note 93, at 459.
196. See, e.g., 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 62, at 630 (describing
McCulloch speaking in Iowa); id. at 697 (describing McCulloch speaking in Maryland);
id. at 989 (describing McCulloch speaking in Wisconsin).
197. Id. at 378-79.

following her marriage ceremony, which was officiated by Dr. Anna
Howard Shaw, the woman suffrage leader and minister, McCulloch

stumped for suffrage in South Dakota with her husband as their

honeymoon vacation. 98 She observed in a letter to the Equity Club:

I had promised to go up to South Dakota to speak in the suffrage campaign
and so that will be my honeymoon with visiting of friends added at the close.
That will be about as practical as Mrs. Sawtelle's [who traveled to Washington,
D.C., to be sworn in to the Supreme Court bar during her honeymoon]. It
strikes me as funny even now, but I guess it will be just as sensible as a
fashionable watering place."

While Mussey was also active in the woman suffrage movement, like
Gillett, most of her suffrage activities post-dated her admission to the

Supreme Court bar in 1896. Although Mussey attended her first woman
suffrage meeting soon after moving to Washington, D.C., in 1869,m and
was acquainted with Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and
Lucretia Mott as early as the 1870s, she did not become active in the
woman suffrage movement until 1909. It was then that she joined
NAWSAY"' In 1910, Mussey testified before a Senate committee on the

importance of women's suffrage.2

Her testimony began as follows:

"From childhood I was reared by my Father, Platt R. Spencer, as an
ardent suffragist. I married General R. D. Mussey[,] another ardent
suffragist-and I have reared two children, a daughter and a son[,J as

ardent suffragists."'

3

She concluded her testimony by declaring that "[w]omen did not make
the conditions from which they suffer-but they ask for the ballot as the
lever to help lift these burdens in some degree." ' In 1912, suffragists
from Boston and Washington, D.C., endorsed both Mussey and Gillett
as nominees to the Supreme Court bench following Justice Harlan's

death.205 Neither woman was nominated for this vacancy by President

198. See Letter from Catharine G. Waugh [McCulloch] to the Equity Club (May 30,
1890), reprintedin DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 191.
199.
200.

Id.
See Florence C. Bell, A Law Pioneer,THE WOMAN CrrzEN, June 27, 1925, at

24.
201. See Catherine M. Rottier, Ellen Spencer Mussey and the Washington College
of Law, MD. HIST. MAG., at 361, 380.
202. See Mrs. Ellen Spencer Mussey, Testimony before Senate Committee (1910)
(on file in the Washington College of Law Archives).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See If Women Could Go on The Bench, BALT. AM., Feb. 12, 1912 (on file in
the Washington College of Law Archives) (featuring pictures of Mussey and Gillett and
reporting on suffragists' recommendation of Mussey and Gillett for Supreme Court
bench); Aspire to Supreme Bench, BntM. LEDGER, Feb. 14, 1912 (on file in the
Washington College of Law Archives). The Birmingham Ledger features photographs
of Mussey and Gillett and declares:
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Taft, however. Mussey subsequently led the lawyers' division of the
March, 1913, woman suffrage parade in Washington, D.C., which was
staged on the eve of Woodrow Wilson's inauguration.
kicker was active in the suffrage movement, beginning in the early
1870s, when she, like Kilgore in Pennsylvania, attempted to vote in New
icker served as an elector on Lockwood's Equal Rights
Hampshire.?
ticket in 1884, and attempted to run for governor of New Hampshire in

1910, but her fee to register to appear on the ballot was refused on the
Ricker was a member of both NWSA and NAWSA
ground of sex.'
3
and served as the New Hampshire delegate to their conventions." She
also traveled on the suffrage circuit, giving speeches to state suffrage
associations.0 Finally, Robinson-Sawtelle spoke in favor of suffrage in
Massachusetts in the 1880s. 1 °

Many people will agree that President Taft might-and probably will-do a
whole lot worse than to appoint a woman as a justice of the supreme court in
the late Justice Harlan's place. Here are two candidates for the place, proposed
by the woman suffragists of Washington. On the left is Miss Emma M. Gillett,
L.L.D., who has practiced law before the supreme court for ten years. On the
right is Mrs. Ellen Spencer Mussey, L.L.D., who has practiced in Washington
for twenty years, and who has been active in securing legislation advantageous
to women.
Id. See also Urge Mrs. Mussey for Judge: Massachusetts Women Want Her on Supreme
Bench, WASH. EVE. STAR, Feb. 19, 1912 (on file in the Washington College of Law
Archives) (reporting on efforts of Boston suffragists to advocate Mussey for newly
vacant seat on Supreme Court); Winnifred Harper Cooley, At the Bar: American Portias
Are Rapidly Increasing in Number and Influence, According to the FeminineLeaders of
the Profession, N. Am., Mar. 24, 1912 (on file in the Washington College of Law
Archives):
A WOMAN seriously suggested to the president of the United States for a
place on the supreme bench! How times are changing! ... Not that any one
expected President Taft to heed the suggestion made him by an organization in
Washington to recognize one of our great women lawyers; still, the possibility
shows that "the world do move."
Id.

206. As Morello reports:
Beginning in 1870 and continuing every year until her death, Ricker would
appear before the selectmen of the town of Dover and, as a law-abiding and
tax-paying citizen, demand the right to vote. Each time she was prevented
from casting a ballot, she vowed she would only pay her taxes under protest
and would be back to vote the following year.
MORELLO, supra note 84, at 222.
207. See id.
208. See Thomas, Ricker, supranote 15, at 155.
209. See 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 62, at 478 (noting Ricker's
speech at suffrage meetings on west coast in 1888).
210. See, e.g., id. at 722.

Thus, these early Supreme Court bar members were actively involved
in the woman suffrage movement. Their leadership activities on behalf
of the movement included public speaking, organizing groups of
women, and lobbying state and national legislatures, which provided
them with excellent training for breaking into the legal profession.
VIII. MEMBERSHIP iN THE EQurry CLUB AND THEMES
REFLECTED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

Six of these early Supreme Court bar members were also members of
the Equity Club, a correspondence society of early women attorneys
formed in 1887 at the University of Michigan Law School, one of the
first law schools to admit women. The Club was formed to address
issues uniquely confronting them as women attorneys. It operated for
four years, and had approximately thirty members, each of whom
submitted one letter per year to the corresponding secretary, who then
copied and circulated the letters to everyone in a compilation called the
Equity Club Annual. The members21npaid annual dues to cover the costs
of copying and mailing the Annual.
The six women who were members of both the Supreme Court bar
and the Equity Club were Bittenbender, Gillett, Gordon, Lockwood,
McCulloch, and Robinson-Sawtelle. Even though the other early
Supreme Court bar members were not also Equity Club members, their
activities were referenced in the Equity Club correspondence. The
letters of the six Supreme Court bar members reveal that they valued the
Club as an important source of connectedness with other women
attorneys. The value that they placed upon this connection, along with
their references to each other as "sisters in law," suggest an "old girls
network" of women attorneys who supported each other's progress in
the legal profession.
One theme running throughout these women's Equity Club

correspondence is their concern with how to define themselves as
women attorneys. Robinson-Sawtelle warned her "sisters" not to be
"lady lawyers. 2 2 She advocated a gender neutral approach when she
advised, "Do not take sex into the practice. Don't be 'lady lawyers.'
Simply be lawyers, and recognize no distinction-no existence of any
distinction between yourselves and the other members of the bar."213
Robinson-Sawtelle's advocacy of a gender neutral approach to
lawyering was consistent with these women's reliance upon gender
211. See generallyDRACHMAN, supranote 85, at 1-18.
212. Letter from Lelia J. Robinson [Sawtelle] to the Equity Club (Apr. 9, 1887),
reprintedin DRACFmAN, supranote 85, at 66.
213. Id. (emphasis in original).
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equality principles in breaking down barriers to women's participation in
the legal profession.
On a related matter, that of proper courtroom attire for women
lawyers-specifically, whether to wear one's hat in court, RobinsonSawtelle wrote:
One problem is not yet settled entirely to my satisfaction, and that is: Shall the
woman attorney wear her hat when arguing a case or making a motion in court,
or shall she remove it? I decided the point for myself, temporarily at least,
when I went into court with my first case. I had always been accustomed, like
the majority of women, to wear my hat or bonnet in public places, and as my
chief idea was to feel as much at ease as I could, I determined to wear a small
hat which set back from the face, knowing that if I should uncover my head
there would be an added sense of unaccustomedness besides that which the
place and the business must create. The4 same feeling has led me to wear hat or
bonnet ever since on similar occasions.2

Thus, Robinson-Sawtelle advised her sisters-in-law to adhere to dress

conventions so as to facilitate male attorneys' acceptance of women's
presence in the courtroom. She observed: "And it seems to me well that
when our object is to accustom judge, jury, clients and the public to the

presence of women attorneys in court, there should be as few minor
variations from the usual customs and appearance of women in public
places as may be., 215 In essence, Robinson-Sawtelle was pragmatic in
advocating conscious manipulation of social conventions regarding

women's appearance as a means to further the ultimate goal of expanded
opportunities for women in the legal profession.
Their Equity Club letters also addressed the question of how women

attorneys should balance their personal and professional lives. For
example, Robinson-Sawtelle inquired, "Is it practicable for a woman to
successfully fulfill the duties of wife, mother and lawyer at one and the
same time? Especially a young married woman?" 216 She requested that
"some of our members would discuss this question in its pros and
cons."2 '7 In response, Bittenbender revealed that she and her husband
had an understanding that they would be celibate, and thereby avoid the

risk of pregnancy, so as to preserve her physical well-being for the
practice of law. Bittenbender noted, "I talked the matter over frankly
214. Letter from Lelia J. Robinson [Sawtelle] to the Equity Club (Apr. 7, 1888),
reprintedin DRAcHMAN, supra note 85, at 127.
215. Id.
216. Letter from Lelia J. Robinson [Sawtelle] to the Equity Club (May 22, 1889),
reprintedin DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 171 (emphasis in original).
217. Id.

with my husband as I do all other interests of life, and since have

received his hearty co-operation in this as in all other efforts I make. I
gladly impart the knowledge which came to me to others as I have the
opportunity.' ' 8 She continued:
Marital excesses, I... believe mainly cause the disarrangement of the "physical
organs pertaining to womanhood." I also believe that they were not "made to
get out of order" any more than those pertaining to manhood. The laws of
nature must be obeyed in sexual intercourse by human beings as they are by
dumb animals .... I would recommend the occupying of
219 separate beds, and
also of bed-chambers when convenient, by married people.

For Bittenbender, liberation from the threat of repeated pregnancies
allowed her to pursue her legal and political activities in a concentrated

manner, without family or the possibility of ill-health to distract her.
On this theme of balancing personal and professional lives, Gillett
noted that a glance through the Equity Club's 1888 Annual suggested

that a single woman had a better chance of success in the legal
profession than a married woman: "A glance through the Annual would
seem to indicate that the majority of the practitioners who are sticking to
their work and .dodding on in the only sure and safe way to win success
are unmarried."
Echoing Bittenbender's advice, Gillett advocated that married women
"insist on equal rights to self-gratification or restraint," stating:
The care of children must necessarily interfere with any thing so sensitive to
interruptions as a law practice. I do not believe the relation of wife alone should
do so. Nor do I sympathize very deeply if it does for no woman has any right to
give up her health, happiness and future prospects in life for the mere
gratification of her husband, but in the marital relation as in every other relation

should insist on equal rights to self-gratification or restraint. I have found
advice of this kind given to wives has almost invariably resulted in increased
respect and happiness in the home and improved health on the part of the
wife. T'

Thus, Gillett believed that married women could succeed as well as
single women in the legal profession, so long as they did not have
children:
Should one attempt to illustrate that either the married or unmarried woman is
capable of doing distinguished work she would not be at a loss for examples.
Either state, rightly lived, should not handicap a woman in her attainments in

218.

Letter from Ada Bittenbender to the Equity Club (May 10, 1889), reprintedin

220.

Letter from Emma M. Gillett to the Equity Club (Apr. 27, 1889), reprintedin
at 162.
Id.

DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 152.
219. Id. at 152-53.
DRACHMAN, supra note 85,

221.
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any department of the world's work it is her deliberate choice to take up.'

As these Equity Club letters well illustrate, making the right choices
about how to balance personal and professional lives was key to these
women's potential for success in the legal profession.
McCulloch responded to Robinson-Sawtelle's question whether a
woman could successfully pursue multiple roles as wife, mother, and
lawyer, by asserting that it was critical who one married. McCulloch
declared that "it makes all the difference in the world who one marries,
and I should never again oppose a woman lawyer marrying, if she
devotedly loved her husband and he was clean and brilliant and
honorable and progressive enough to be proud that his wife was a
Noting that her husband was very supportive of her legal
lawyer."
career, McCulloch's letters detailed how they balanced their personal
and professional lives together by sharing their law practice as well as
their housekeeping duties.
Another theme addressed in the Equity Club letters was whether and
how the members valued the Club, each other, and associations of
women attorneys generally. Robinson-Sawtelle underscored the moral
support that she gained from participation in the Equity Club when she
thanked her fellow club members "for your kind words of sympathy and4
appreciation for my book. They are very sweet to me, believe me."2n
Likewise, in one of her first Equity Club letters, Gordon underscored the
value she derived from coming together with other women attorneys:
There is a certain "moral support" in the confiding sympathy of brave-souled,
warm-hearted women, who have dared and suffered in kind with ourselves,
which becomes a tower of strength to nerve the heart and sustain the brain when
both are taxed to the utmost as is often the case in the practice of our grand
profession. I became convinced years ago, that the few women lawyers of the
country should become better acquainted for their mutual benefit, and acting
upon such conviction, wrote to several of my sisters in the profession, from
which resulted a correspondence both pleasant and profitable. That the
excellent motto selected by the Equity Club may be fuly realized, is my earnest
desire, and it would give me great pleasure to correspond with such individual
members of the Club with whom this feeling may be mutual. m

Conscious of their potential for influencing reform within the legal
222. Id.
223. Letter from Catharine Waugh McCulloch to the Equity Club (Nov. 8, 1890),
reprintedin DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 192.
224. Letter from Robinson [Sawtelle], supra note 212, at 63.
225. Letter from Laura D. Gordon to the Equity Club (Apr. 26, 1887), reprintedin
DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 50-51 (emphasis in original).

profession, Gillett, McCulloch, and other Equity Club members formed
a subcommittee to discuss women attorneys' relations to the established

bar associations."
Gordon's reference to "the excellent motto" of the Equity Club, in

emphasizing the importance of associations of women lawyers, raises a
question as to which sense of the term "equity" she intended to invoke.
Was she referring to equity in its traditional legal sense, as that system
of dispute resolution based on principles of fairness and justness that
served to moderate the harsh effects of rigidly gjplied legal doctrines,
and was thought to be more feminine in nature? Or was she referring
to equity in its common meaning, as the absence of bias and prejudice.r

For the Club's founding members, the motto of "equity" signified both
the feminine realm of law and the absence of prejudice. In the particular
context of Gordon's letter, it would appear that she used the term
"equity" in the second sense (i.e., as the absence of bias).
In addition to highlighting the moral support that membership in the

Equity Club provided as an organization sympathetic to women's
endeavors in the law, Gordon emphasized that it was important for
women attorneys to come together to lobby for expanded rights for all

women:
I think it would be a most desirable object, if the Club could arrange for a Grand
Annual Reunion of the Lady Lawyers of America, that we might be able, by
personal acquaintance and the discussion of topics of grave importance to all
women, not only benefit ourselves as members of a profession, but do much
good for all woman kind. Our laws are, in many instances, inimical to the well
being and interests of women, and to those of the Legal Profession must our
sisters thus discriminated against, look for relief.m

As such, Gordon emphasized women attorneys' obligations to help all
women through education and reform of the laws. Likewise, Lockwood
wrote about the importance of educating girls and women about the law:
In this day and age of the World, when so many avenues of trade, and so many
professions are opening to women, the ground principles of the laws of each
State (and they should be uniform) should be taught to the girls of the public
schools. Women have always been the chief sufferers of bad legislation, and if
being the weaker physically it is harder for them to acquire a fortune, the more
226. See Report of Martha Pearce, Corresponding Secretary, the Equity Club
(Summer 1888), reprintedin DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 84 (describing procedures for
distribution of Equity Club letters and attaching Club's constitution).
227. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 280 (5th ed. 1983) (defining "equity" as
"Uj]ustice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated
rules of common law").
228. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIoNARY 421 (1983) (defining
"equity" as "justice according to natural law or right; speci, freedom from bias or
favoritism").
229. Letter from Gordon, supra note 225, at 51.
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need of the legal knowledge of how to keep it. There is plenty of room to-day

for women who are willing to apply themselves in the law.
It is an old maxim in England that every gentleman's son should know the law.

We ought to reverse that in our Country and expect every lady's daughter to be

versed in the law, that she may be early schooled to a necessary protection of
herself and children.2"

Not only did Lockwood suggest that every girl be taught the law, but
that law was an appropriate profession for women to become armed with
the means of self-protection.
It is striling the extent to which the themes discussed in the Equity
Club letters of the 1887-90 period continue to concern women attorneys
today.
IX. CONSCIOUSNESS OF BEING FIRST WOMEN LAWYERS
Many of these early Supreme Court bar members had achieved firsts
for women both within and without the legal profession, as noted in Part
V above. These experiences as first women simultaneously raised and
reflected their awareness of the existence of barriers to equality for
women generally and women lawyers specifically, and of the need to
break them. Their active involvement in the suffrage movement was an
outgrowth of this awareness.
The Equity Club letters of Gillett, Gordon, Lockwood, and RobinsonSawtelle reveal that these early Supreme Court bar members possessed a
heightened consciousness of their status as first women attorneys. They
were aware that their successes or failures would impact other women's
efforts to enter the legal profession insofar as they served both as role
models for women specifically and examples for society generally.
Gillett and Robinson-Sawtelle both advocated a narrow focus on career
success to safeguard women attorneys from potential gender-based
attacks that might use any failures by women as evidence of their
inability to serve as lawyers.
Gillett's consciousness of needing to succeed as a woman lawyer and,
hence, to set a good example for other women and society generally, is
demonstrated in the following letter to the Equity Club:
I have endeavored to do thoroughly and conscientiously whatever I have had to

230. Letter from Belva A. Lockwood to the Equity Club (Apr. 30, 1887), reprinted
in DRAcHMAN, supra note 85, at 59.

do, to stick to my profession and not be lured into any class of philanthropic or
other work, knowing the law to be a jealous mistress and believing that I could
do no better work than to prove what a woman could by persistent application
earn a competency at the law as one of the many who are doing it, and to avoid
notoriety.
To
a faithful adherence to these rules, I owe the modicum of success I have
attained.2"

Gillett's Equity Club letters reveal that, as a single woman without

husband or children to distract her, she was able to pursue her
professional interests in an intensely-focused manner, which she
recommended to other women lawyers as the means to attaining career
success.

Gillett advised her fellow women lawyers to follow an essentially
male model by refusing to do volunteer lawyering during their office
hours and housework during their free time. She advocated against

charitable legal work because she believed that women already carried
heavy burdens in conducting their law practices given their status as
first, and thereby model, women attorneys. Accordingly, Gillett

believed that women attorneys should not undermine their ability to
succeed in the profession by devoting any of their resources to charitable
work, which might distract from a narrow focus upon career
advancement *2 On this theme, Gillett's April 27, 1889 letter to the
Equity Club advised:
Charity clients should be shunned unless in extreme cases. They have no more
right to a lawyer's services for nothing than a washer-woman's, and when one
takes charity clients to any extent she lowers her professional tone besides using
her capital of time and strength. If she uses all of her income for charity that is
her matter but if she drives herself beyond her strength and fails in her work it
concerns us all."

Gillett's reference to the potential for failure that "concerns us all"
clearly demonstrates her consciousness of the need for the first wave of

women attorneys to be cautious and purposeful in their pursuit of career
success so as to safeguard opportunities for later women attorneys.

Similarly, Gillett believed that women lawyers should reject
housework in order to preserve their energy for office work and
safeguard their free time for relaxation.2

She advised as follows:

A further matter of importance is how we spend our leisure hours. If we have

home work pressing on us during office hours and hurry home to assume cares
231. Letter from Emma M. Gillett to the Equity Club (Apr. 18, 1888), reprinted in
DRACHMAN, supra note 85, at 96-97.
232. See Letter from Gillett, supra note 220, at 161.
233. Id.
234. See id.
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of various kinds we cannot expect a fine nervous condition. Men go home to
their dinner, evening paper, a stroll down town, or a chat over the fence with a
neighbor4

In place of housework, Gillett advocated that women engage in vigorous
exercise to promote their physical and mental well-being for work*'6 In
this vein, she declared, "Work done when weary is usually below the
standard, which we cannot afford." 7 Again, Gillett's reference to the
problem of work performed below the standard, "which we cannot
afford," demonstrates her belief that the first wave of women lawyers
must be conscious of the ramifications of their choices and actions upon
the legal professional opportunities of future generations of women.
Ultimately, Gillett advocated that women follow the male model of

lawyering in order to flourish within their chosen profession: "If we take
up work that has been monopolized by men we should study the manner
in which they have accomplished the work and how they have spent the
hours not occupied by their profession, and follow the general line of
their experience."" 8
Like those of Gillett, Robinson-Sawtelle's Equity Club letters
emphasized the unique obligations that befell the first women lawyers.
For example, Robinson-Sawtelle asserted that women lawyers had a
special duty to practice law once they joined the bar so as to prove
themselves worthy of membership in the profession. Despite having
taken time off from the practice of law to promote her book on basic
legal principles for laypeople, Robinson-Sawtelle observed:
[T]he one thing I wanted to say was that now women had proven themselves
entirely capable of studying law, it was all essential for them to prove
themselves capable of practicinglaw, and that it was the duty of every woman
who had been admitted to the bar to get into active practice as quickly as
possible, and to stay there, working her way, rapidly or slowly, as other lawyers

work theirs.2 9

Like Gillett, Robinson-Sawtelle was conscious of her status as a model
woman lawyer, upon whom other women's opportunities in the legal
profession would depend. Indeed, Robinson-Sawtelle advertised free
consultations for women on Saturdays, beginning in 1889.m
235.
236.

237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
See id. at 159-62.

Id. at 160.
Id. at 161-62.
Letter from Robinson [Sawtelle], supra note 212, at 117 (emphasis in original).
See DRACuMAN, supranote 85, at 260.

As for the others, Gordon's Equity Club letters reveal a heightened
consciousness of the need for women lawyers to unite to lobby for legal
reforms, and Lockwood advocated teaching girls and women about the
law 2so
4 as to encourage more women to enter, and thereby change, the
law. '
Though not a member of the Equity Club, Foltz's activities reveal a
sharpened consciousness of being in the first wave of women lawyers
and wanting to assist other women join the profession. For example,
Foltz organized the Portia Law Club in San Francisco in 1893, helped
found the Women Lawyers Club in 1918, and taught law to women

students for several years in her Los Angeles law office. 242
Publications by these early women members of the Supreme Court bar
also reveal an awareness of the significance of their being among the
first wave of women lawyers in the United States. For example,
Bittenbender demonstrated this awareness when she wrote an article
entitled "Woman in Law" for Catharine Waite's Chicago Law Times,
which was then reproduced in expanded form as the 'Woman in Law"
chapter of Annie Nathan Meyer's 1891 book, Woman's Work in
America."3 Likewise, Lockwood's and Robinson-Sawtelle's articles on
early women lawyers, with Lockwood's particular focus on the first
seven women members of the Supreme Court bar, reveal a hei htened
awareness of the significance of the woman lawyer phenomenon.
Finally, Mussey and Gillett revealed their consciousness of the
dilemmas confronting early women lawyers when they chose a
coeducational, rather than single-sex, format for establishing the
Washington College of Law. Even though WCL was founded primarily
for women, Mussey and Gillett adopted a coeducational format partly in
light of their belief that it signified gender equality. Thus, Mussey and
Gillett employed a different model from that of the women's medical
schools, which were premised upon gender difference ideology, in order
to create an environment in which women could demonstrate that their
intellectual acumen was equal to men's." Indeed, the Washington
241. See text accompanying notes 229-230.
242. See Gilb, Folt7, supra note 120, at 642.
243. See Bittenbender, Cm-. LAW TIMEs, supra note 57, at 301 (describing
achievements of Bradwell, Foltz, Gordon, Kilgore, Lockwood, and McCulloch);
Bittenbender, WOMAN'S WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 21, at 218 (same).
244. See Lockwood, supra note 57, at 45-47 (addressing achievements of
Bittenbender, Gillett, Gordon, Kilgore, Lockwood, and Robinson-Sawtelle); Robinson,
supranote 57, at 10 (noting achievements of many of these early women lawyers).

245.

See Clark, supra note 9, at 647-56.

Here, the author draws upon the

Washington College of Law's 1898-99 Catalogue, which states, "As co-education is
believed to be the true method, men are admitted to the College on an equal footing with

women." Washington College of Law Catalogue, 1898-99, at 1. The same catalogue
speaks in co-educational terms in explaining why legal education is important:
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College of Law graduated successful women lawyers, including Judge
Mary O'Toole of the District of Columbia municipal court, Judge
Kathryn Sellers of the District of Columbia juvenile court, and Alice

Paul, President of the National Woman's Party.m
X.

CONCLUSION

Why did these women join the Supreme Court bar, given that many of
them were not courtroom litigators and only a small number actually
filed briefs or argued in the Supreme Court? The backgrounds,
activities, and thoughts of thirteen of the first twenty female members
reveal that they joined the bar at least in part as a further step in breaking
down barriers to women's entry into the legal profession.
To further their feminist mission, these early women attorneys moved
each other's admission in the Supreme Court bar, as, for example, when
Ada Bittenbender moved the admission of Emma Gillett in 1890, the
first time one woman moved the admission of another. This practice of
supporting each other's applications for admission suggests the efforts of
an "old girls' network" of "sisters in law" who promoted each other's
opportunities in the legal profession.
Of course, these women may have also joined the Supreme Court bar
because they genuinely wanted, and expected, to practice there, but
pervasive sex discrimination prevented them from doing so, where few
clients or male colleagues were willing to hire them to file briefs or
present argument in the high court. Indeed, there continue to be very
few female Supreme Court advocates. One recent study estimated
women's representation in the Supreme Court bar as 7.3 women per one
hundred members. 4 7 Another study estimated the percentage of women
among those who actually argued before the Court during one term at
The reasons advanced as to the importance of men pursuing this study apply
equally to women. Both are amenable to the law, and ignorance of the law
excuses neither. Both are governed by the law in all business matters,
including the descent of property. Both find the knowledge valuable either as
a means of caring more advantageously for their own property or of earning a
livelihood.

Id. at 8.

246. See, e.g., Washington College of Law Foundedby Women, WASH. PosT, Nov.
20, 1921, at 2 (announcing, "Many Graduates of This Coeducational Institution Have
Attained Prominence-Steady Growth Since Earliest Years Has Put College Among
Foremost Schools of Its Kind-Alumni and Students Loyal and Enthusiastic.").
247. See McGuME, supra note 3, at 35.

fourteen percent.2 8 Of those women briefing and arguing cases in the
Court today, a disproportionate number are employed by local, state, or
federal agencies by comparison with the composition of the bar
generally," where the government has historically provided women
lawyers with better employment and advancement opportunities than
private practice.

Regardless of their aspirations to practice in the Supreme Court, these
women were motivated to join the bar at least in part by their
commitment to furthering opportunities for women. This commitment
guided them into, and through, their legal careers, differentiating them
from other women professionals, most notably, women doctors, insofar
as women lawyers pursued an integrationist, rather than a separate
spheres, approach to the profession. Their roles as "first women" in the
law-attending and establishing law schools, holding positions within
the legal profession previously closed to women, and joining barsreflected and refined their consciousness of breaking down barriers for
women in the legal profession. For them, joining the Supreme Court bar
was another in a series of steps towards eliminating impediments to
women's participation in the legal profession.
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Venue, WASH. POST, May 27, 1997, at A3.
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